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COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 



BY 
JOSEPH W. RICH 




PUBLISHED AT IOWA CITY IOWA IN 1911 BY 
THE STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF IOWA 






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COPYRIGHT 1911 BY THE STATE 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY OP IOWA 



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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 

In the Battle of Shiloh there is much to interest 
the student of Iowa history. This State had more 
men in the conflict, in proportion to its population, 
than any other. Eleven Iowa regiments of infan- 
try were engaged, namely : the Second, the Third, 
the Sixth, the Seventh, the Eighth, the Eleventh, 
the Twelfth, the Thirteenth, the Fourteenth, the 
Fifteenth, and the Sixteenth. Besides these regi- 
ments there were in the Twenty-fifth Missouri, 
which was the regiment that furnished the recon- 
noitering party sent out on Sunday morning, April 
6th, three Iowa companies, namely: Company F, 
Company I, and Company K. 

The Sixth Iowa Regiment claims the distinction 
of being the first regiment to disembark at Pitts- 
burg Landing, and the Eighth claims the distinction 
of being the last regiment to retire from the line in 
the Hornets' Nest. Five Iowa regiments were in 
the Hornets' Nest; and three of the number, the 
Eighth, the Twelfth, and the Fourteenth, were cap- 
tured. All of the other Iowa regiments were in the 
thick of the conflict on Sunday. 



EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 



Before the close of the war there were promotions 
of both officers and men from among those engaged 
in the Battle of Shiloh ; while several participants 
attained civil distinction during and after the war. 
Major Wm. M. Stone of the Third Regiment and 
Lieutenant Buren R. Sherman of the Thirteenth 
Regiment served the State as Governor. Sherman 
served as Auditor of State three terms before be- 
coming Governor. Major W. W. Belknap of the 
Fifteenth Regiment became Secretary of War ; and 
Lieutenant David B. Henderson of the Twelfth 
Regiment, after long service in the lower house of 
Congress, became Speaker. Many others from 
Iowa who engaged in the battle served the State 
in the General Assembly, in Congress, and in other 
official stations of responsibility. 

Mr. Joseph W. Rich, the author of this mono- 
graph, was himself a participant in the battle as a 
member of Company E of the Twelfth Iowa Regi- 
ment. He had enlisted on October 1, 1861, for the 
term of three years; but about the middle of his 
term of service he was discharged from the hospital 
on surgeon's certificate of disability. Having been 
on the field during both days of the battle and hav- 
ing subsequently (in 1908) gone over the ground 
with Major D. W. Reed, Secretary of the Shiloh 



EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 



National Military Park Commission, Mr. Rich lias 
been able to bring to these pages the first-hand in- 
formation of an eye witness as well as the evidences 
of documentary sources. 

This account of the Battle of Shiloh first ap- 
peared in the October, 1909, number of The Iowa 
Journal of History and Politics, and has received 
most favorable comment from such men as General 
Frederick D. Grant, General Grenville M. Dodge, 
General Charles Morton, and General John H. 
Stibbs. Indeed, it is not often that a writer of his- 
tory succeeds in being so accurate in his presenta- 
tion of facts and so fair and non-partisan in his 
judgments as to satisfy those who, as participants in 
or as special students of the events described, have 
or believe they have first-hand information. Mr. 
Rich is, therefore, to be congratulated upon the uni- 
formly favorable criticism which followed the first 
appearance of his monograph. 

Benj. F. Shambaugh 

Office of the Superintendent and Editor 

The State Historical Society of Iowa 

Iowa City 1911 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

No apology is offered for the appearance of an- 
other paper on the Battle of Shiloh, for the reason 
that the last word to be said on the subject has not 
been said, and indeed will not have been said until 
the last serious misrepresentation, made through 
ignorance, prejudice, malice, or for any other rea- 
son, has been corrected. It is not in the thought of 
the writer that he will be able to contribute addi- 
tional facts to the literature of the subject; but it 
is hoped that the facts may be so grouped and illus- 
trated as to leave a clearer picture of the battle in 
the mind of the reader. 

As far as the writer knows the movements of the 
battle on Sunday, April 6, 1862, have not heretofore 
been illustrated except by means of one general 
map, showing progressive movements of the battle 
lines throughout the day. Such a map can be little 
better than a puzzle-picture to the general reader. 

The original map from which the tracings were 
made to illustrate the Battle of Shiloh was prepared 
under direction of the Shiloh National Military 
Park Commission, to accompany its account of the 
battle, entitled The Battle of Shiloh and the Organ- 



10 AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

izations Engaged, compiled from official records by 
Major D. W. Reed, Historian and Secretary of the 
Commission. To insure accuracy in the original 
map, the field was carefully platted by the Commis- 
sion's engineer, Mr. Atwell Thompson, and the 
camps and battle lines were located by Major D. 
W. Reed, after an exhaustive study of official docu- 
ments, aided by the recollections of scores of officers 
and men engaged in the battle on the respective 
sides. The reader must remember, however, that 
the lines were never for a moment stationary, so 
that it would be a physical impossibility to repre- 
sent them correctly at short intervals of time. The 
analysis here given of the general map published by 
the Commission, it is believed, will aid materially 
in understanding the battle. 

Though not offering an apology for this paper, 
the writer is disposed to justify its appearance 
somewhat by referring briefly, by way of introduc- 
tion, to a few illustrative errors and misrepresen- 
tations sought to be corrected, pointing out some of 
the so-called histories and memoirs where they are 
to be found. Of course it is not to be presumed 
that these errors and misrepresentations were in- 
tentional : they are due mainly to two causes — to 
the " smart" newspaper correspondent, whose main 
object was sensation ; and to the unreliable historian 
whose main weakness was indolence in searching 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE 11 

for facts. Prejudice may in a few cases have con- 
tributed to the pollution of the historic stream. 

Special acknowledgments are due from the 
writer to Major D. W. Reed, Secretary and His- 
torian of the Shiloh National Military Park Com- 
mission, for valuable suggestions in the preparation 
of this paper. The writer is also under obligations 
to Lieutenant Wm. J. Hahn of Omaha, Nebraska, 
a member of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, who was 
of the Major Powell reconnoitering party, sent out 
by Colonel Peabody on Sunday morning, April 6th ; 
and also to T. W. Holman of Rutledge, Missouri, 
who was a member of the Twenty-first Missouri In- 
fantry and was with the regiment when it went out 
to reenforce the reconnoitering party and the 
pickets. 

Joseph W. Rich 

The State Historical Society* of Iowa 
Iowa City 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

One of the worst as it was one of the first of the 
sensational stories of the Battle of Shiloh put in 
historic form was the account by Horace Greeley in 
his American Conflict. The camp at Pittsburg 
Landing before the battle is likened to a Methodist 
campmeeting, and the Union army on Sunday 
morning is represented as a "bewildered, half- 
dressed, .... helpless, coatless, musketless mob", 
upon which the enemy sprang "with the bayonet". 
This account has Prentiss's division "routed before 
it had time to form a line of battle ;" and Sherman's 
division is "out of the fight by 8 o'clock". 1 

J. S. C. Abbott in his story of the Battle of Shiloh 
as given in his two-volume History of the Civil War, 
gathered his material from the same sensational 
sources and he used it in the same sensational way 
as did Mr. Greeley. 

A more pretentious work, which appeared much 
later, was Scribners' History of the United States 
in five volumes. This work appeared after original 
sources of information had become easily accessible ; 
and yet in its account of the Battle of Shiloh it is 
the sinner of sinners for untruthfulness. It is no 



14 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

exaggeration to say of the Scribners' account of the 
battle what General Beauregard is credited with 
having said of General Halleck's report to the Sec- 
retary of War at Washington as to the condition 
of the Confederate army after the evacuation of 
Corinth — "it contains more lies than lines". 

Another of the sensational type, though of pre- 
tentious title, is Headley 's History of the Rebellion. 
Headley represents the Union officers as still in 
bed, when the "inundation" came, and says that 
"the troops seizing their muskets as they could, fled 
like a herd of sheep". Unfortunately for the rep- 
utation of Mr. Headley as a historian, the facts are 
all against him — he allowed himself to be misled 
by the fiction-writers. 

John Codman Ropes, who enjoys something of a 
reputation as a critical writer, in his recent Story of 
the Civil War, published by the Massachusetts His- 
torical Society, shows plainly that he followed very 
closely the account as given by General Buell, in his 
Shiloh Reviewed; and he shows, also, a prejudiced 
judgment against Grant and in favor of Buell — 
whom he evidently admired. Mr. Ropes makes it 
appear that none of the divisions near the Landing- 
were in line until after Sherman and Prentiss had 
fallen back from their first lines, about ten a. m. 
He leaves it to be inferred also that Buell had an en- 
tire division on the west side of the river and in the 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 15 

fight on Sunday night ; and he figures that not more 
than five thousand of Grant's five divisions, which 
were engaged in the battle on Sunday, were in line 
at the close of the day. 

John Fiske is another writer on Civil War sub- 
jects, and in his Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 
he describes the Battle of Shiloh, but not without 
some rather serious errors. For instance he attri- 
butes the "wait-for-Buell" policy to Grant — it 
was due to his superior, General Halleck. He says 
that General McClernand was the ranking officer 
at Pittsburg Landing in General Grant's absence, 
which is not correct — General Sherman was the 
ranking officer. He makes no mention of the re- 
connoitering party that went out from Prentiss's 
division before daylight on Sunday morning, but 
says that "when the Confederates attacked in full 
force on Sunday morning, the Federals were in 
camp and not in line of battle. " On the same page, 
however, he gives himself a flat contradiction by 
telling how Prentiss had formed line and advanced 
a quarter of a mile, where he received "the mighty 
rush of the Confederates" — and the time he fixes 
at about half past five o'clock, which is an error of 
fully two hours. 

On one page he gives the strength of the Confed- 
erate arm}^ as 36,000, exclusive of cavalry, and on 
another page his "reckoning" is 30,000 on the same 



16 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

basis. He criticises General Johnston for giving 
so much attention to the divisions of Prentiss and 
Sherman, at the opening of the battle, when he 
should have massed heavily against Stuart, the ex- 
treme left of the Union line, forgetting, if he ever 
knew, that Prentiss and Sherman must be forced 
back before Stuart could be attacked. The plan 
suggested by Fiske would have exposed the Con- 
federate flank to the two divisions of Prentiss and 
Sherman, which would have been a blunder. The 
corps organization of the Confederate army ap- 
pears, by inference, to have been well maintained ; 
whereas they began to commingle at the beginning 
of the battle, and the corps were practically broken 
up by ten o'clock. 

Mr. Fiske is again in error in leaving the infer- 
ence that an entire brigade of Nelson's division was 
in at the close of the fight on Sunday night. And 
still another error is the statement that three Con- 
federate brigades participated in the last attack 
near the Landing. He gives the number of guns in 
Grant's last line far below the facts, and then specu- 
lates upon what might have been if General Beaure- 
gard could have "put 6,000 to 8,000 fresh reserves 
into the fight against his weary antagonist", appar- 
ently never thinking of the converse of the specu- 
lation. Mr. Fiske appears to be particularly unfor- 
tunate in the handling of statistics. He makes it 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 17 

appear that Lew. Wallace brought 7,000 men to 
Grant's right, and Nelson about the same number 
to his left, on Sunday night — an error of 4,000 or 
more. If Mr. Fiske had trusted less to Shiloh Re- 
viewed and more to official records, he would have 
made fewer mistakes. 

Henry Villard, who was a newspaper correspond- 
ent with Buell's army, has written what he calls 
" Memoirs", and "in order to impart greater accu- 
racy and perhaps some novelty", to his "sketch" 
of the Battle of Shiloh, he goes to Confederate re- 
ports for his information. His "sketch" abounds 
in errors, even to the misquoting of one of General 
Grant's dispatches, thus changing a negative to an 
affirmative statement. 

As recently as 1895 a Brevet Brigadier General, 
U. S. V., Henry M. Cist, in his Army of the Cum- 
berland, quotes approvingly from Comte de Paris 's 
History of the Civil War as follows : "At the sight 
of the enemy's batteries advancing in good order, 
the soldiers that have been grouped together in 
haste, to give an air of support to Webster's bat- 
teries, became frightened, and scattered. It is 
about to be carried, when a new body of troops de- 
ploying in the rear of the guns .... received the 
Confederates with a fire that drives them back in 
disorder". 2 Mr. Cist quotes also from Whitelaw 
Reid's Ohio in the War as follows: "He [Buell] 



18 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

came into the action when, without him, all was lost. 
He redeemed the fortunes of the field, and justly 
won the title of the 'Hero of Pittsburg Landing' ". 3 
Of the second quotation it needs only to be said that 
its author was the newspaper correspondent who 
wrote the first sensational and untruthful account 
of the Battle of Shiloh. The other quotation may 
well pass for an Arabian Nights tale. 

General Lew. Wallace, commanding the second 
division of Grant's army, having his camp at 
Crump's Landing six miles down the river from 
Pittsburg Landing, has left for us his Autobiogra- 
phy, which in many respects is an interesting work. 
But if it is to be judged by its account of the Battle 
of Shiloh, in which Wallace participated on the 
second day, the author's reputation as a writer of 
fiction will not suffer. General Wallace accepts 
the first stories as to the " complete surprise" of the 
camp and offers argument to prove the contention. 
Then he proceeds to upset his own argument by 
showing that Prentiss and Sherman had their divi- 
sions in line of battle before six o'clock, or before 
the Confederate lines began to move to the attack. 
He brings the advance of Buell's army on the field 
some three hours before it was actually there ; has 
General W. H. L. Wallace mortally wounded about 
the same length of time before the incident oc- 
curred ; has General Johnston killed in front of the 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 19 

Hornets ' Nest. He credits the men in the Hornets ' 
Nest with holding the position "for two or three 
hours", whereas it was "held" from about 9:30 a. 
m. to about 5 :30 p. m. "against the choicest chivalry 
of the South, led by General Johnston himself", to 
quote General Wallace. In fact, General Johnston 
led no assault upon the Hornets' Nest, or upon any 
other position in the Union line. These are a few 
of many fictions in Wallace's Autobiography, 
where, of all places, the truth should be found. 

Had it been true that the position at the Hornets ' 
Nest was held "for two or three hours" only, 
Grant's center would have been broken while Nel- 
son's division was still ten miles away, and about 
the hour when Wallace's division started on its 
fifteen mile march. In that event, the story of the 
Battle of Shiloh would have been a different story. 
Grant's army would, probably, have been defeated, 
and Buell's army then strung out over thirty miles 
of country road, might easily have suffered the same 
fate. Fortunately, General Wallace was writing 
fiction. 

At the risk of tediousness one more writer on the 
Battle of Shiloh will be mentioned. General Buell, 
who participated in the battle of the second day, in 
a carefully prepared paper, entitled Shiloh Be- 
vieived, 4, takes the position of an advocate before a 
court and jury, stating what he expects to prove, 



20 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

then marshalling his facts — or fictions, as the case 
may be — to make good his contention. He opens 
his case with the following proposition: "At the 
moment near the close of the day when the remnant 
of the retrograding army was driven to refuge in 
the midst of its magazines, with the triumphant 
enemy at half -gunshot distance, the advance divi- 
sion of a reenforcing army arrived .... and took 
position under fire at the point of attack; the at- 
tacking force was checked, and the battle ceased 
for the day." The reader, not familiar with the 
facts, must necessarily draw two inferences from 
this statement: (1) that an entire division of 
Buell's army was "at the point of attack" ; (2) that 
the presence of such a body of fresh troops decided 
the fate of the day. Both inferences are erroneous, 
as the facts will show. 

On one point of some importance, General Buell 
flatly contradicts himself. In speaking of the at- 
tack near the Landing, Sunday night, he says, in 
Shiloh Reviewed, that the "fire of the gunboats was 
harmless". In his official report written just after 
the battle, he says that the "gunboats contributed 
very much to the result" — the repulse of the en- 
emy. 

Perhaps a perfectly fair and unprejudiced ac- 
count of the Battle of Shiloh ought not to have been 
expected from the pen of General Buell. He had, 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 21 

or fancied that tie had, grievances against both Gen- 
eral Grant and General Halleck — and he was 
human. 

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT 

The Battle of Shiloh was not an isolated incident : 
it was one of a series of incidents, more or less close- 
ly related, in which the Army of the Tennessee fig- 
ured prominently and effectively, but with divided 
responsibilities. It is, therefore, proper to take 
into account conditions precedent to the battle be- 
fore passing judgment upon the men and the com- 
manders who happened to be present at the moment, 
and upon whom fell the immediate responsibilities, 
and who suffered for the shortcomings of others. 
The Army of the Tennessee was at Pittsburg Land- 
ing under the orders of an officer superior in rank 
to the officer in immediate command; and it was 
there for a definite purpose. If it did not accom- 
plish the definite purpose, it may be answered, in 
extenuation at least, that it was not permitted to 
try — its hands were tied and it was ordered to 
"wait". It waited until compelled to fight for its 
own safety. It saved itself from defeat and, very 
probably, saved from destruction another army of 
equal strength. 

It is of no consequence who first suggested the 
line of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers as the 



22 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

weak point in the Confederate line between Colum- 
bus on the West and Bowling Green on the East. 
It would have been a reflection on military genius, 
if the suggestion had not come to several persons 
at about the same time — so patent was the evidence. 
It is of some importance, however, to remember 
who made the first move to save the "weak point". 
Just seven months before the Battle of Shiloh (Sep- 
tember 6, 1861), the first direct step was taken 
leading to that event. 

On September 4, 1861, General Grant took com- 
mand of the Cairo district with headquarters at 
Cairo, General Fremont being then department 
commander with headquarters at St. Louis. On the 
day after taking command of the district, General 
Grant learned of an expedition from Columbus to 
occupy Paducah at the mouth of the Tennessee. A 
force was at once prepared to anticipate the Con- 
federate movement; a dispatch was then sent to 
headquarters that the force would move at a certain 
hour unless orders were received to the contrary. 
No order came back, and Paducah was occupied 
without firing a shot on the next morning much to 
the surprise of the inhabitants who were hourly ex- 
pecting the Confederates then on the march. Gen- 
eral Grant returned to Cairo on the same day, find- 
ing there the order permitting him to do what was 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 23 

already done. The same movement that saved the 
Tennessee saved also the Cumberland. 

Except for this prompt action on the part of Gen- 
eral Grant the mouths of these two rivers would 
surely have been strongly fortified ; but, instead, the 
Confederate line was forced back a hundred miles, 
in its center, to Fort Henry on the Tennessee and 
Port Donelson on the Cumberland (Map I). 

Columbus, a few miles below Cairo, strongly for- 
tified and garrisoned by the Confederates, was so 
situated that it might, unless threatened from Cairo 
and Paducah, throw troops either west into Mis- 
souri or east by rail to Bowling Green or to points 
within easy marching distance of Fort Henry and 
Fort Donelson as there might be need. As a result 
of these conditions, there was activity in Grant's 
district, during the fall and winter months of 1861. 
The battle of Belmont (Nov. 7, 1861) was one of the 
"diversions" to keep the garrison at Columbus at 
home. In the following January, General Halleck 
having become department commander, expeditions 
were sent out from Cairo and Paducah to the rear 
of Columbus and up the west bank of the Tennessee 
— General C. F. Smith commanding the latter ex- 
pedition. General Smith, having scouted as far 
toward Fort Henry as he thought advisable, went on 
board the gunboat Lexington "to have a look" at 
the Fort. The gunboat went within "about 2% 



24 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

miles drawing a single shot from the enemy 

in response to fonr several shots fired at them." 
In his report (Jan. 22, 1862) to General Grant, Gen- 
eral Smith said: "I think two iron-clad gunboats 
would make short work of Fort Henry." 5 

On the same day that General Smith reported on 
Fort Henry, General Grant was given " permission 
to visit headquarters" in response to a request made 
some time before — but he soon learned that advice 
and suggestions in regard to affairs in his district 
were not wanted, and he went back to his command. 
He ventured, however (Jan. 28th) to send the fol- 
lowing to his superior: "With permission, I will 
take Fort Henry .... and establish and hold a large 
camp there. ' ' 6 Permission was granted on the 30th, 
and Grant was "off up the Tennessee" (February 
2nd). 

Except for this appeal for "permission" to take 
Fort Henry, backed by the advice of Flag-Officer 
Foote, commanding the gunboat flotilla, the expedi- 
tion would have been delayed at least two weeks, 
giving that much more time for the Confederates to 
strengthen themselves. On the day after the sur- 
render of Fort Henry (February 6) Halleck tele- 
graphed to Buell that he "had no idea of commenc- 
ing the movement before the 15th or the 20th in- 
stant". 7 And he was evidently very uneasy about 
the success of the movement, as appears from a dis- 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 25 

patch sent to the General-in-Chief (McClellan) at 
Washington at the very moment when Foote 's guns 
were pounding at the little mud fort. The dispatch 
was as follows : "If you can give me ... . 10,000 
more men, I will take Fort Henry, cut the enemy's 
line, and paralyze Columbus. Give me 25,000 and 
I will threaten Nashville .... so as to force the 
enemy to abandon Bowling Green without a bat- 
tle." 8 Before that dispatch was received in Wash- 
ington the thing was accomplished by a gunboat 
bombardment of an hour and fifteen minutes at 
Fort Henry. 

Notwithstanding the fact that the expedition 
against Fort Henry was undertaken before Halleck 
was ready for it and the fact that he had misgivings 
as to its success, he yet seems to have been jealous 
lest Buell might share in the honors in case of suc- 
cess. When Buell learned of the movement, which 
was undertaken without consultation with him, he 
telegraphed Halleck to know if "co-operation" on 
his part was "essential to ... . success," to which 
Halleck replied : "Co-operation at present not es- 
sential." 9 Buell was piqued at Halleck 's reply, 
and telegraphed to the General-in-Chief : "I pro- 
test against such prompt proceedings, as though I 
had nothing to do but command 'Commence firing' 
when he starts off. ' ' 10 

This episode is mentioned only for the purpose of 



26 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

showing that there were personal complications be- 
tween these three commanders that, possibly, had 
some bearing on the Battle of Shiloh. The affairs 
of the succeeding three weeks, after Fort Henry, 
did but complicate the complications, and upon Gen- 
eral Grant fell the unfavorable results. 

No person was more surprised than was General 
Halleck at the success of the expedition to Fort 
Henry, but he continued to appeal to the General- 
in-Chief for "more troops" while Grant was pre- 
paring to advance upon Fort Donelson and after 
the investment of that place : (February 8th) with- 
out more troops, "I cannot advance on Nashville"; 
(February 10th) "Do send me more troops. It is 
the crisis of the war in the West" ; (February 14th) 
' ' Can 't you spare some troops from the Potomac ? ' ni 

Two days after the last appeal, Fort Donelson 
surrendered, and Clarksville and Nashville waited 
only to be "occupied". They were occupied, re- 
spectively, on the 21st and 25th, without opposition. 
Nashville was occupied by Nelson's division of 
Buell's army which was sent to reenforce Grant at 
Donelson ; but, arriving too late, it was sent directly 
forward to Nashville by order of Grant, the latter 
following in person for the purpose of conferring 
with Buell — and this last move came near being 
the undoing of General Grant who mortally offend- 
ed his superior by pushing the campaign too rapid- 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 27 

ly, arousing at the same time the jealousy of Buell 
by occupying Nashville just ahead of his [Buell's] 
army approaching from the North. General Grant 
was in " ahead of the hounds", at Nashville — that 
was his only offense. 

FKOM FORT DONELSON TO SHILOH 

On the day that Nashville was occupied by the 
Union troops (February 25) the Confederates be- 
gan the evacuation of Columbus, the last defense on 
the original line, and began at once to establish a 
new line along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from 
Columbus southward to Corinth and from Memphis 
eastward through Corinth to Chattanooga on the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, with General 
Beauregard in command, Corinth being the stra- 
tegical point at the crossing of the two roads 
(Map I). 

After the evacuation of Nashville the Confeder- 
ates under General Johnston moved southward as 
rapidly as possible, striking the Memphis and 
Charleston road at Decatur, thence moving west to 
Corinth, the advance reaching that place March 
18th. General Johnston reached Corinth on the 
24th, assuming command of the combined Confed- 
erate forces on the 29th. 

The commanders of the two Union armies, Hal- 
leck and Buell, after Nashville, did not fully agree 



28 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

as to the best plan of following up the advantages 
already gained. Buell thought, with the General- 
in-Chief (McClellan), that Chattanooga was of 
"next importance" after Nashville 12 and he pre- 
pared to follow Johnston south. Halleck thought 
that the line of the Tennessee River offered the 
opportunity to strike the enemy's center at or near 
Corinth 13 and he urged Buell to join him in that 
movement, but without avail. A few days later, 
however, General Halleck secured what he had long- 
desired, the consolidation of the two Departments 
with himself in command. Halleck urged his 
claims on two grounds: (1) that all of the armies 
of the West should be under one command, and (2) 
that the command should fall to him in recognition 
of the successful campaign against Fort Henry and 
Fort Donelson in his Department. 14 The consolida- 
tion took place on March 11th, after which date 
General Buell was subject to orders from St. Louis, 
as General Grant had been from the first. General 
Buell's advance southward from Nashville had 
reached Columbia on Duck River before the con- 
solidation (March 10), but his headquarters were 
still at Nashville. 

On the first of March it appears that General 
Halleck notified General Grant that his column 
would move "up the Tennessee", and that the main 
object would be "to destroy the railroad bridge over 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 29 

Bear Creek, near Eastport .... and also the con- 
nections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt." He 
was instructed to "Avoid any general engagement 

with strong forces better retreat than to risk 

a general battle." 13 Two days later, General Hal- 
leck sent to the General-in-Chief the complaint 
against General Grant, which resulted in the latter 's 
practical suspension from active command, Halleck 
suggesting at the same time that General C. F. 
Smith command the expedition up the Tennessee. 
In response to Halleck 's complaint, he was author- 
ized to put General Grant under arrest, "if the good 
of the service requires it", to which Halleck replied : 
"I do not deem it advisable to arrest him at pres- 
ent ' V 6 On the fourth of March, Halleck dispatched 
to Grant: "You will place Maj. Gen. C. F. Smith 
in command of expedition and remain yourself at 
Fort Henry. ' ' To this, Grant replied, on the next 
day: "Troops will be sent, under command of 
Major-General Smith, as directed. I had prepared 
a different plan, intending General Smith to com- 
mand the forces which will go to Paris and Hum- 
boldt, while I would command the expedition upon 
Eastport, Corinth, and Jackson in person." He 
then assures General Halleck that instructions will 
be carried out "to the very best" of his ability. 17 

Under this order of his superior, General Grant 
remained at Fort Henry, acting in the capacity of 



30 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

a forwarding-officer, until the 17th of the month 
— the most important two weeks between the date of 
the order to proceed up the Tennessee and the 6th 
of April following, when the camp was attacked at 
Pittsburg Landing. The expedition was planned 
without consultation with General Grant, com- 
mander of the district, and it was directed, except 
in minor details, from headquarters in St. Louis 
both before and after March 17th — the date of 
General Grant's restoration to active command of 
the army in the field. 

The expedition left Fort Henry on March 9th 
imder command of General Smith, with full author- 
ity from the Department commander to select the 
place of landing. 18 General Smith established head- 
quarters at Savannah, on the east bank of the river, 
but sent one division (General Lew. Wallace) five 
miles farther up to Crump's Landing on the west 
bank of the river, where his division went into camp 
on the 12th. On the 13th Wallace sent an expedition 
west about fifteen miles to the Mobile and Ohio 
Railway near Bethel station, where about a half- 
mile of trestle work was destroyed. 19 The damage 
to the road was slight, however, as repairs were soon 
made (Map I). 

On the 14th General Smith reported that he had 
"not been able to get anything like the desired infor- 
mation as to the strength of the enemy, but it seems 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 31 

to be quoted at 50,000 to 60,000 from Jackson 
through Corinth and farther east. ' ' It was this in- 
formation that induced General Smith "not to 
attempt to cut the communication at that place, 
[Corinth] as that would inevitably lead to a colli- 
sion in numbers" that he was "ordered to avoid". 2 " 
Immediately after this report was made, General 
Sherman was ordered with his division to a point 
some distance above Pittsburg Landing, with in- 
structions to cut the Memphis and Charleston road, 
if j)Ossible, at some point east of Corinth. The 
attempt failed on account of high water and Sher- 
man dropped back to Pittsburg Landing, where he 
met Hurlbut's division sent up by General Smith as 
support in case of need. The two divisions left the 
boats at Pittsburg Landing and went into camp. 
General Sherman sent out a strong reconnoitering 
force toward Corinth, and on the 17th he reported 
to General Smith: "I am satisfied we cannot 
reach the Memphis and Charleston Road without a 
considerable engagement, which is prohibited by 
General Halleck's instructions, so that I will be 
governed by your orders of yesterday to occupy 
Pittsburg strongly." 21 

General Lew. Wallace, whose division was at 
Crump's Landing at this time, says in his Autobio- 
graphy that if General Smith had received the or- 
der from Halleck that he expected, to move directly 



32 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

on Corinth, "there had been no battle of Shiloh." 
And again he says that by the time General Grant 
was restored to command, the opportunity of ad- 
vancing on Corinth was "going, if not already 
gone ' '." 

General Grant was restored to active command 
on March 17th, and going at once to General Smith's 
headquarters at Savannah he reported on the 18th 
the distribution of troops as he found it — three 
divisions on the west side of the Tennessee, Sher- 
man and Hurlbut at Pittsburg Landing, and Lew. 
Wallace at Crump 's Landing ; at Savannah, on the 
east side of the river was McClernand's division; 
and on transports on the river, waiting for orders, 
were several regiments which were ordered to Pitts- 
burg Landing. It is important to remember this 
distribution of the army as General Grant found it, 
under the sanction if not the direct order of the De- 
partment commander. That General Halleck still 
believed it possible to cut the Memphis and Charles- 
ton Railroad, according to his original plan, is 
shown by a dispatch to General Grant (March 18th) 
based on a rumor to the effect that the enemy had 
moved from Corinth to attack the line of the Ten- 
nessee below Savannah, that is, to attack Grant's 
communications. "If so," says General Halleck, 
"General Smith should immediately destroy rail- 
road connections at Corinth." 23 To this General 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 33 

Grant replied on the 19th: "Immediate prepara- 
tions will be made to execute your .... order. I 
will go in person". 24 Again, on the next day in a 
lengthy dispatch to Halleck 's Adjutant General, 
Grant repeated his intention to go "in person" with 
the expedition ' ' should no orders received hereafter 
prevent it" — adding that he would "take no risk 
.... under the instructions ' ' which he already had ; 
that if a battle seemed to be inevitable, he could 
"make a movement upon some other point of the 
railroad .... and thus save the demoralizing effect 
of a retreat". 25 

General Halleck evidently thought there was 
special significance in Grant's intention to "go in 
person" with the expedition toward Corinth — he 
knew something would be doing — so, on the 20th 
Halleck dispatched : "keep your forces together un- 
til you connect with General Buell .... Don't let 
the enemy draw you into an engagement now." 26 

Before this last dispatch was received, orders 
were issued by General Grant to all division com- 
manders to hold themselves ready to march at a 
moment's notice, with three days' rations in haver- 
sacks and seven days' rations in wagons. On re- 
ceiving the "wait" order, Grant dispatched again 
(March 21): "Corinth cannot be taken without 
meeting a large force, say 30,000. A general en- 
gagement would be inevitable ; therefore I will wait 



34 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

a few days for further instructions. ' ' 2T Evidently 
General Grant was restive and anxious, believing 
that precious time was going to waste, as appears 
from what he wrote to General Smith: "the sooner 
we attack the easier will be the task". 28 

As far as the records show, no orders later than 
March 20th were received by General Grant ; and so 
the army within striking distance of the enemy was 
in a state of suspended animation for nearly three 
weeks. The army was expected to cut the Memphis 
and Charleston road, but it was not permitted to 
fight for the purpose ; it must do it without disturb- 
ing the enemy. 

It is important to remember in this connection 
that the territory west of the Tennessee River, from 
near its mouth southward to Pittsburg Landing 
and west to the Mississippi, was the enemy's coun- 
try both in sentiment and by strong military occu- 
pation, and so the expedition under General Smith 
up the Tennessee was moving fully two hundred 
miles from its base of supplies, wholly dependent 
upon the river. This territory was well supplied 
with railroads under control of the enemy, by means 
of which, if so disposed, he might throw a strong 
force on short notice against General Smith's com- 
munications. General Grant evidently had this 
danger in mind when replying to General Halleck's 
order sending the expedition up the river, as already 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 35 

quoted. But in this as in other things, General 
Grant's advice was not sought and his suggestions 
were not heeded. The conditions at Pittsburg 
Landing were not of his making — they were ac- 
cepted as they were found, even after three re- 
quests to be relieved of command in the Depart- 
ment, because of the strained relations between his 
superior and himself. 29 

GENERAL BUELL'S MOVEMENTS 

In pursuance of his plan after Nashville, to fol- 
low the enemy south, on March 10th, General Buell 
reported his advance at Columbia, Tennessee, at the 
crossing of Duck River. 30 The consolidation of the 
two Departments occurred on the 11th, and on the 
13th, General Halleck, as if in some degree appre- 
ciating General Buell 's embarrassment, wrote him 
as follows : ' ' The new arrangement of departments 
will not interfere with your command. You will 
continue in command of the same army and dis- 
trict of country as heretofore, so far as I am con- 
cerned." 31 Definite orders to General Buell soon 
followed the consolidation; March 16th: "Move 
your forces by land to the Tennessee .... Grant's 
army is concentrating at Savannah." Again on 
March 20th : ' ' important that you communicate with 
General Smith as soon as possible." And again on 



36 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

March 29th : ' ' You will concentrate all your avail- 
able troops at Savannah, or Pittsburg, 12 miles 
above." 32 

As already stated, General Buell had one division 
at Columbia — about forty miles on the road to 
Savannah — when the order came to join Grant. 
The remainder of the army moved promptly, but 
was detained at the crossing of Duck River in build- 
ing a bridge until the 30th, though one division 
(Nelson's) waded the river on the 29th. 

Naturally General Grant, in front of a rapidly 
concentrating army under General Johnston and 
General Beauregard, was anxious to know of Gen- 
eral Buell 's movements, and so, two days after as- 
suming active command, two couriers were started 
from Savannah for Buell 's camp which was reached 
on the 23d with this dispatch from Grant: "I am 
massing troops at Pittsburg, Tennessee. There is 
every reason to suppose that the rebels have a large 
force at Corinth, Miss., and many at other points 
on the road toward Decatur." 33 Thus General Buell 
had positive knowledge both from General Halleck 
and General Grant that the latter was " massing 
troops" at Pittsburg Landing — and this informa- 
tion was in possession of General Buell a full week 
before his army was able to cross Duck River (about 
90 miles away) and two weeks before the battle. 
This point is dwelt upon for the reason that cer- 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 37 

tain writers have erroneously claimed that General 
Buell had not been informed of General Grant's 
position on the west bank of the Tennessee and 
hence did not press his march. 

After wading Duck River as stated, General Nel- 
son 's division went into camp for the night, and 
took up the march next morning (the 30th) reach- 
ing Savannah about noon, April 5th, having 
marched an average of twelve miles a day. 34 Gen- 
eral Buell arrived in Savannah "about sundown", 
on the same day, but he did not make his presence 
known, nor was his presence known to General 
Grant, when the latter, with his staff, took boat next 
morning for the battle field after an ' ' early break- 
fast ' ' left unfinished. 

It need not be matter of surprise that General 
Buell should be reluctant to join his army of about 
equal strength and independent in command with 
the army on the Tennessee. It was Buell 's wish to 
strike the Tennessee higher up and conduct a cam- 
paign of his own. With this in mind he suggested 
to General Halleck that he [Buell] be permitted to 
halt and go into camp about thirty miles east of 
Savannah, at Waynesboro. To this suggestion Gen- 
eral Halleck replied on the 5th: "You are right 
about concentrating at Waynesborough. Future 
movements must depend upon those of the enemy. ' ' 35 
General Buell issued orders to "concentrate", but 



38 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

fortunately his advance had passed the point desig- 
nated before the orders were delivered, and the 
march continued. Had it been otherwise the reen- 
forcing army would have been forty miles away, 
instead of its advance division being within ten 
miles, when the battle began. 

It may be asked: Why did not General Buell 
make his presence in Savannah known to General 
Grant promptly on arrival? Perhaps a perfectly 
just answer cannot be given in view of the fact that 
the former was not required to "report" to the 
latter as a subordinate to a superior — the one was 
to join the other and wait for orders from a higher 
source than either. There was but one contingency 
under which any part of General Buell 's army could 
come under General Grant's orders — an attack 
upon the latter. General Halleck's instructions to 
General Grant were (April 5th) : ' ' You will act in 
concert, but he [Buell] will exercise his separate 
command, unless the enemy should attack you. In 
that case you are authorized to take the general 
command." 36 The contingency arose on the morn- 
ing of the 6th. 

BEFORE THE BATTLE 

From the date of General Halleck's "wait" or- 
der to the date of the battle — that is from March 
20th to April 6th — there were fifteen full days, dur- 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 39 

ing which time this positive order was in force: 
"My instructions not to advance must be obeyed." 
Nothing, therefore, remained but to watch the en- 
emy and dodge him in case he offered battle in any 
considerable force. There was scarcely a day in 
that waiting time in which there was not recon- 
noitering, resulting in several light encounters. 
Colonel Buckland, commanding the fourth brigade 
of General Sherman's division, has given a good ac- 
count of the condition of things at the front during 
the three or four days before the battle in a paper 
read before the Society of the Army of the Tennes- 
see in 1881 and published in the Proceedings of the 
Society. 37 

On Thursday, April 3d, three days before the 
battle and the day on which the Confederates 
marched from Corinth and surrounding camps, 
Colonel Buckland under orders of the division com- 
mander reconnoitered four or five miles toward 
Corinth, finding the enemy in such force as to deter 
him from attack, in view of the order to "fall back" 
rather than risk bringing on a general engagement. 
The brigade marched back without an encounter. 
On the next day the picket line was attacked in front 
of Buckland 's brigade, and a picket post was cap- 
tured, consisting of a Lieutenant and seven men. 
Colonel Buckland went out with a regiment to inves- 
tigate and had two of his companies surrounded by 



40 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

Confederate cavalry, which was in turn surprised 
and routed by the reenf orcements sent to the relief 
of the two companies. Just as the enemy appeared 
to be forming for a counter attack on Buckland, the 
Fifth Ohio cavalry of Sherman's division came up, 
attacked and routed the enemy, capturing several 
prisoners. This affair developed the presence of 
the enemy in considerable force — infantry, caval- 
ry, and artillery. When Colonel Buckland reached 
the picket line, on his return to camp, he found 
General Sherman with several regiments awaiting 
him and wanting to know, with a show of displeas- 
ure, what he had been doing out in front. After 
hearing Colonel Buckland 's account of the matter, 
he was ordered back to camp with his men, General 
Sherman accompanying the order with the remark 
that he might have brought on a general engage- 
ment, which is to be understood as a mild reprimand. 

So particular was General Sherman to avoid cen- 
sure that he required Colonel Buckland to make a 
written report of the incident which report was sent 
to General Grant. 

Colonel Buckland further says that he was along 
the picket line several times on Saturday, the day 
before the battle, and saw the enemy at several 
points, and that the pickets reported activity near 
the lines. Other officers made similar observations. 
"It was the belief of all", says Colonel Buckland, 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 41 

"that the enemy intended to attack us, either dur- 
ing the night or early in the morning ' \ 38 This feel- 
ing was so strong that regimental officers were in- 
structed to have their commands in readiness for 
attack — the picket line was strengthened and a 
line of sentries was established from the picket line 
back to camp. 

Similar evidence as to the activity of the enemy 
on Saturday the 5th is furnished by Captain I. P. 
Rumsey, a staff officer of General W. H. L. Wallace, 
who was riding outside the lines on that day. On 
returning to camp Captain Rumsey reported to Col- 
onel Dickey, 4th Illinois cavalry, that he had seen a 
considerable body of Confederate cavalry. The 
two officers going to General Sherman's headquar- 
ters, reported the facts, to which General Sherman 
replied : "I know they are out there, but our hands 
are tied ; we can 't do a thing. ' ' Colonel Dickey then 
asked permission to take his regiment out to investi- 
gate, receiving for reply: "Dickey, if you were to 
go out there with your regiment you would bring 
on a battle in less than an hour, and we have positive 
orders not to be drawn into a battle until Buell 
comes." 39 

Colonel McPherson, Halleck's chief engineer, 
who was camping with the second division (W. H. 
L. Wallace) fully corroborates the above state- 



42 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

ments, by saying: "It was well known the enemy 
was approaching our lines". 40 

Apprehension of an early attack upon the camp 
prevailed among the subordinate officers of General 
Prentiss's division, as well as among those of Gen- 
eral Sherman's division, and similar orders were 
given to companies and regiments to be prepared for 
a night or an early morning attack. And it seems 
now to be well settled that the reconnoitering party 
sent out from Prentiss's division before daylight on 
Sunday morning was sent out by Colonel Peabody 
of the 25th Missouri, commanding the first brigade 
of the division, and without the knowledge of Gen- 
eral Prentiss. 

In the history of the 25th Missouri, edited and 
compiled by Dr. W. A. Neal, Assistant Surgeon of 
the regiment, and published in 1889, appears a de- 
tailed account of the action of Colonel Peabody on 
the eve of the battle, as related by Lieutenant James 
M. Newhard, at the time Orderly Sergeant of Com- 
pany E, 25th Missouri, one of the companies in the 
reconnoitering party. It is related that Colonel 
Peabody urged upon General Prentiss on Saturday 
the 5th that an attack was very probable and that 
preparation ought to be made accordingly. As 
nothing was done except to strengthen pickets and 
guards Colonel Peabody, under the influence of a 
premonition that an attack would be made early in 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOII 43 

the morning- and that he would not survive the battle, 
decided to take upon himself the responsibility of 
sending out a party to reeonnoiter. So Ma j or Pow- 
ell, an officer of the Regular Army and Field Officer 
of the Day was ordered to take three companies of 
the 25th Missouri, start at about 3 o'clock in the 
morning, and march until he found the enemy. The 
companies constituting the party were B, H, and E, 
of the 25th Missouri. How and where the enemy 
was found will be related farther on. 

Some persons will have doubts, probably, in re- 
gard to the story of Colonel Peabody 's premonitions 
of attack, and death in battle, but there can be no 
doubt about the attack, or about the death of Colonel 
Peabody, within a few minutes after the main bat- 
tle began. Major Powell was also killed early in 
the battle, and so the two principal actors in the first 
scene of the drama passed quickly off the stage, 
but not until after the chief of the two was severely 
reprimanded, at the head of his brigade in line and 
waiting for orders. The following letter, to a 
nephew of Colonel Peabody, here given by permis- 
sion, tells the story. 

333 Highland Av. 
Me. F. E. Peabody, Somerville, Mass. Feby. 27th 1902 

Box 7 Boston. 
Dear Sir: 

Referring to our conversation concerning the Battle of 
Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, April 6 & 7, 1862, I have to 



44 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

state that: Everett Peabody, Colonel of the 25th Mo. Vol. 
Inft., was in command of the first Brigade 6th Division and I 
was senior Captain of the regiment. 

At early morn before breakfast the line of Battle was 
formed, with the right of Brigade resting on the right of our 
regimental color line. My company was on the right of Bri- 
gade. A few minutes after the line was formed, General Pren- 
tiss rode up near Colonel Peabody, who was mounted and in 
front of my company, about the center of the first platoon 
and said to him, ' ' Colonel Peabody, I hold you responsible for 
bringing on this fight. ' ' Saluting, Colonel Peabody said : "If 
I brought on the fight I am able to lead the van." G-eneral 
Prentiss ordered him to take his best regiment .... the next 
words I heard were : ' ' 25th Missouri, forward. ' ' 
Signed Yours respectfully, 

F. C. Nichols, 
Captain U. S. Army, Retired; 
formerly Major & Capt. 25th Mo. 
Vol. Inf. War of '61 & 5. 

This letter by Capt. Nichols makes clear and pos- 
itive two important points: (1) that General Pren- 
tiss, like General Sherman, was impressed with the 
idea that, under General Halleck's orders the en- 
emy was to be avoided rather than sought out, and 
he reprimanded his brigade commander for doing, 
irregularly, the very thing that saved the army 
from the "surprise" about which so many un- 
truths have been told; (2) the letter makes it clear 
that Prentiss's division was neither in bed nor at 
breakfast, when the attack came — it was in line 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 45 

"before breakfast", and the enemy was received 
with a hot fire, as will appear. 

Prentiss's reprimand of Colonel Peabody was, 
doubtless, prompted by the same sense of responsi- 
bility as was that administered by General Sher- 
man to Colonel Buckland, already mentioned. It 
had been "ground into" each division commander, 
so to speak, that, "in no case" were they "to be 
drawn into an engagement." 

There was another incident in the activities im- 
mediately preceding the battle, more important 
than anything yet mentioned, which, however, was 
not revealed, until forty years later — an incident 
which, had it been known when and by whom it 
should have been known, the Battle of Shiloh would 
have had a different story to tell. We now know, 
though the knowledge is comparatively recent but 
entirely reliable, that General Lew. Wallace, com- 
manding the second division of the army at Crump's 
Landing, had positive information of the movement 
of the Confederate army to attack Grant on the very 
day that the movement began — information 
brought directly to him by one trusted scout and 
confirmed by a second. During two full days and 
three nights ("for three days and nights," to quote 
his language) he "simmers" this all-important in- 
formation in his mind, trying to determine how he 



46 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

could best reenforce the comrades beyond Snake 
Creek in case of need. 

General Wallace tells in Ms Autobiography how 
and when the information came to him of the move- 
ment of the Confederate army from Corinth as 
follows : 

"About as the sun set, Thursday, the 4th [3d], 
Bell the scout came into my tent, evidently the worse 
for a hard ride, and said, abruptly, 'I bring you 
news, sir. . . . The whole rebel army is on the way up 
from Corinth. . . . They set out this morning early. 
By this time the}^ are all on the road .... batteries 
and all. ' This important information was confirm- 
ed by another scout (Carpenter) : 'Johnston's cut 
loose and is making for Pittsburg. ' " 41 

General Wallace says that he sent this informa- 
tion by his orderly, on the same evening to Pitts- 
burg Landing, with instructions in case Grant was 
not found to leave the dispatch with the postmas- 
ter, to be delivered next morning. General Wal- 
lace's excuse for not sending a proper officer with 
positive orders to find Grant, seems almost too 
puerile to be credited — he did not want to appear 
' ' officious ' '. The dispatch never reached its proper 
destination, and the secret was in the keeping of 
General Wallace until he disclosed it in his Autobio- 
graphy. For his own reputation, it might better 
have died with him. A dispatch boat was at all 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 47 

times at Wallace's headquarters, subject to his or- 
ders, and there should have been no difficulty in the 
way of finding General Grant within two hours, 
whether at the Landing above or at Savannah below. 
It is worth remembering in this connection that the 
orderly sent with this dispatch went by the river 
road and over Snake Creek bridge which had been 
repaired on that very day under direction of Colonel 
McPherson, Halleck's chief engineer. General 
Wallace pleaded ignorance of this road, two days 
later, in excusing himself for marching his division 
over the wrong road. 

THE UNION ARMY AND THE FIELD 

To understand and properly appreciate the diffi- 
culties under which the Battle of Shiloh was fought 
on the Union side, the composition of the Army and 
the topography of the field must both be considered. 
The Army of the Tennessee as it was camped in the 
woods above Pittsburg Landing on Sunday morn- 
ing, April 6, 1862, was never in a camp of organiza- 
tion and instruction, as an Army — it grew by accre- 
tion, beginning at Fort Donelson in the middle of 
February preceding. Some of the regiments that 
stormed the enemy's works at Donelson dropped 
into line for the first time under fire, and only a few 
hours before the assault was made. In like manner 
new and untrained regiments and batteries came, 



48 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

one by one, to swell the ranks at Shiloh, even after 
the roar of battle sounded through the woods, tak- 
ing their assigned places under fire. The division 
(Prentiss's 6th) from which the reeonnoitering 
party went out before daylight on Sunday morning 
to "surprise" the enemy was the newest of the new, 
having but two organized brigades — though there 
was enough "raw material" assigned to the divi- 
sion for a third brigade, not all on the ground, how- 
ever, when the battle began. Attention is called to 
these facts for the reason that they should be taken 
into account in passing judgment upon the Battle 
of Shiloh. 

Besides the lack of organization and drill of the 
army the character of the field upon which the bat- 
tle was fought should be considered. It has been 
said with much truth that a clear understanding of 
the Battle of Shiloh cannot be had without studying 
the movements on the ground. A written descrip- 
tion can convey only a very general idea of the 
plateau upon which the battle was fought ; hence a 
map showing the principal streams, roads, open 
fields, etc., is added to aid the study of the positions 
and movements (Map II). 

The plateau, rising eighty to one hundred feet 
above the Tennessee on the east, was surrounded 
by almost impassable barriers on all sides — except 
an opening to the southwest, two and a half to three 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 49 

miles in width. The plateau sheds its waters west, 
north, and east — west and northwest into Owl 
Creek; north into Snake Creek; and east into the 
Tennessee. The creeks were effectually guarded 
by swampy margins and heavy timber, or by a com- 
bination of the three — timber, under-brush, and 
swamp. They admitted of no crossing except by 
bridges, of which there was one on each of the 
streams leading to and from the battle field. The 
Tennessee could be crossed only by boat, as the army 
had never been supplied with pontoons. 

This plateau, bordered as described, was cut into 
numerous gullies and ravines by small spring- 
branches, running to all points of the compass in 
finding their tortuous ways to the larger streams. 
Most of these spring-branches ran through marshy 
ground — impassable in the early spring except 
where bridged. Some of the ravines were deep, 
miry, and so densely choked with briers and bram- 
bles as to defy invasion by anything much larger 
than a rabbit. The hillsides and the ridges were 
covered with timber and underbrush, except where 
small farms were under cultivation. There was not 
an elevation anywhere on the three miles square 
from which a general view could be had. Wide 
flanking movements were impossible to either army, 
and cavalry was practically useless. The Landing 
itself was a mud bank at the foot of a steep bluff, a 



50 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

single road winding around the bluff and up the 
hillside to higher ground. At a distance of about a 
half-mile from the Landing the road forked and a 
little further on struck the Hamburg and Savannah 
road, running nearly parallel with the river. Still 
further on the Corinth road crossed the Hamburg 
and Purely road and struck the Bark road, one 
branch three miles out and the other branch four 
miles out. Besides these main roads shown on the 
map, there were numerous farm roads winding 
around on the ridges, and the needs of the army 
made many new roads — all were deep in mud made 
of the most tenacious clay, so that the unloading of 
boats and the hauling to camp was a slow and labor- 
ious process for both man and mule. 

Had John Codman Ropes understood the topog- 
raph}^ and other conditions of the field of Shiloh, 
he would hardly have ventured to criticise General 
Johnston for making a front attack upon the com- 
mands of Hurlbut, Prentiss, and Wallace, and for 
failing to force his way along the Hamburg and 
Savannah road on the Union left at an earlier hour. 
General Johnston had no choice but to make a front 
attack and he did his best to force his way along the 
Hamburg and Savannah road, toward the Landing 
at the earliest possible hour. Why and how he failed 
to accomplish his main object, before the close of the 
day, will appear later. The ground between the 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 51 

Hamburg and Savannah road and the river was 
much broken — so much so that there were but two 
or three cultivated fields on that part of the plateau. 

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY AND ITS ORJECTIVE 

As already stated, after the surrender of Fort 
Donelson and the evacuation of Nashville General 
Johnston's army fell back as rapidly as possible 
southward to the line of the Memphis and Charles- 
ton Railroad with a view to joining General Beaure- 
gard, who commanded the territory west of the 
Tennessee River with headquarters at Corinth. By 
the last week in March there had been concentrated 
at Corinth and in the vicinity an army of 40,000 
effective men, and General Johnston took command 
on the 29th of March with General Beauregard sec- 
ond in command. The object to be accomplished by 
this army was to attack and defeat Grant's army be- 
fore the arrival of Buell, then on the march from 
Nashville with 37,000 men, following up this antici- 
pated success with the defeat of Buell, thus opening 
the way back to Nashville so recently evacuated. The 
movement from Corinth and surrounding camps to 
attack Grant began in the early morning of April 
3d, with a view to making the attack early on the 
5th. Bad weather and bad roads delayed the attack 
twenty-four hours — to Sunday morning, April 6th. 



52 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

How the expected "surprise" of Grant's army was 
anticipated will now be told. 

THE BATTLE 

It is not the purpose to describe in detail the move- 
ments of the battle throughout the two days, but 
only to touch upon salient features. One of the 
salient features, and not the least important, is that 
of the action of the reconnoitering party heretofore 
referred to as having been sent out before daylight 
on Sunday morning from Prentiss 's division. Gen- 
eral Prentiss in his official report makes no men- 
tion of the Powell party, but he says that "at 3 
o'clock .... Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Mis- 
souri, with five companies of his infantry regiment, 
proceeded to the front, and at break of day the ad- 
vance pickets were driven in". 42 

Colonel Moore, in his official report, says that he 
was ordered out by Colonel Peabody, commanding 
the First Brigade, "at about 6 o'clock", to support 
the picket guard which "had been attacked and 
driven in". It appears to be certain, therefore, 
that both the reconnoitering party under Major 
Powell and the support under Colonel Moore were 
ordered out by Colonel Peabody without consulting 
the division commander ; hence the reprimand above 
quoted — heard and remembered by many others 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 53 

besides Captain Nichols. Colonel Moore 's command 
was a reenforcing not a reconnoitering party. 

The line of march of the Powell party may be 
traced on the map (No. II) along the road passing 
the camp of the 25th Missouri, past the southeast 
corner of Rhea Field and the north side of Seay 
Field, passing the picket line at the forks of the road 
and striking the corner of Fraley Field a few rods 
farther on. From this point the videttes of the Con- 
federate picket, under Major Hardcastle of Har- 
dee's corps were encountered. The videttes fired 
upon the advancing party and retired to the picket 
line at the southwest corner of Fraley Field. The 
fight between the picket post and Powell's party 
began at once, though it was still quite dark — ' i too 
dark to see, in the timber and underbrush", so the 
firing at first was at random. As there never was 
an official report made of the part taken by the 
Powell reconnoitering party, as both the officer 
ordering it out and the officer commanding it were 
killed early in the main battle, we must rely upon 
the report of the officer commanding the Confeder- 
ate picket at Fraley Field for the incidents of that 
encounter. Major Hardcastle says the firing began 
' i about dawn " (at 4 :55 in fact) , and he says : ' ' We 
fought the enemy an hour or more without giving 
an inch". "At about 6:30" he saw the brigade 
formed behind him and "fell back". The casual- 



54 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

ties in Major Hardcastle's command were four 
killed and nineteen wounded. 43 The casualties in 
the Powell party were never certainly known. 

This stubborn picket fight seems to have been 
something of a " surprise" to at least one of the 
Confederate generals. General Bragg, command- 
ing the second line of attack, says in his official re- 
port that ' ' the enemy did not give us time to discuss 
the question of attack, for soon after dawn he com- 
menced a rapid musketry fire on our pickets." 44 
Major Hardcastle, commanding this picket line, 
says : ' ' The enemy opened a heavy fire on us at a 
distance of about two hundred yards". 45 That the 
Confederate line was not ready to move forward at 
once when the firing began appears from Major 
Hardcastle 's official report. He says : "At about 
6 :30 a. m. I saw the brigade formed in my rear and 
fell back. " 45 So there was a full hour and a half 
elapsed between the beginning of the firing and the 
movement forward. The battle front, two and a half 
to three miles in extent with a curtain of skirmish- 
ers, advanced to the attack. Major Powell's party 
and the Union pickets that joined him fell slowly 
back, carrying their dead and wounded until they 
met Colonel Moore with five companies of his regi- 
ment (21st Missouri). Colonel Moore taking com- 
mand, sent back for the other five companies of his 
regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Woodyard. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 55 

The force now consisted of the 21st Missouri, three 
companies of the 25th Missouri, four companies of 
the 16th Wisconsin, and two companies of the 12th 
Michigan — all infantry. This force formed in 
Seay Field and advanced to a point near the north- 
west corner of the field, where the Confederate 
skirmishers were encountered, the 8th and 9th Ar- 
kansas (Map III). There was a sharp fight at 
this point lasting about thirty minutes, in which 
Colonel Moore was severely wounded. Lieutenant 
Mann of the same regiment was wounded, and Cap- 
tain Saxe (16th Wisconsin) was killed — the first 
Union officer killed in the Battle of Shiloh. 

As the Confederates advanced, the little Union 
force moved slowly back across Shiloh Branch, 
forming again at a point about two hundred yards 
from the southeast corner of Rhea Field, where 
the remainder of Peabody's brigade was in line. 
This position was held from a half hour to an hour 
against two brigades (Shaver's and Wood's). 
While falling back in line from this point Major 
King (21st Missouri) was mortally wounded. 
Meantime, General Prentiss had formed the re- 
mainder of his division (Miller's brigade) and had 
advanced about eighty rods from the front of his 
camp to the south side of Spain Field (Map III), 
where he was joined by Peabody's brigade, Powell's 
party, and the pickets. The division, now consist- 



56 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

ing of seven regiments and two batteries, was here 
attacked by four brigades — Wood, Shaver, Glad- 
den, and Chalmers — comprising twenty regiments 
and three batteries. Against this tremendous odds 
the position was held for about thirty minutes, when 
the division fell back to the line of the camp where 
another stand of about thirty minutes was made, the 
division finally retiring at about nine o'clock — 
more than five hours after the reconnoitering party 
marched out. Among the casualties on the Union 
side in front of Prentiss's division were Colonel 
Peabody and Major Powell, killed 46 ; and on the 
Confederate side General Gladden was mortally 
wounded. 

There is ample testimony in the official reports 
of Confederate officers to show that the resistance 
met by their several commands in the slow advance 
from the picket line had none of the features of a 
sham battle. There were many casualties on both 
sides — how many was never certainly known. 
There was no bayoneting of Union men on their 
beds in their tents or elsewhere. Indeed there was 
never any foundation for such stories except in the 
imagination of sensational newspaper correspond- 
ents. And it is further to be stated that at the time 
when the lines came in collision at the front — about 
8 o 'clock — every regiment in the camp, three miles 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 57 

in extent, was in line waiting orders or was march- 
ing toward the sound of battle. 

A word of explanation should here be made in 
regard to General Sherman's (5th) division. This 
division was the first to go into camp at Pittsburg 
Landing, and the necessities of the situation re- 
quired it to cover three important approaches from 
the back country to the Landing ; namely, the main 
Corinth road ; a bridge on the Hamburg and Purdy 
road over Owl Creek ; and a ford over Lick Creek 
near its mouth which accommodated travel from 
Hamburg both to Purdy and Savannah. The cross- 
ing of Owl Creek was about three miles west of the 
Landing, and the crossing of Lick Creek was about 
the same distance to the south of the Landing ; while 
the Corinth road ran southwest nearly midway be- 
tween the two crossings. General Sherman camped 
three brigades (1st, 3d, and 4th) to occupy the Cor- 
inth road at Shiloh meeting-house, thus covering 
Owl Creek bridge. The other brigade (Stuart's) 
camping to cover Lick Creek crossing, was separat- 
ed from the division by a little mpre than one mile, 
and it remained separated throughout the first day's 
battle, acting independently of the orders of the divi- 
sion commander. The space between the two parts 
of Sherman's division was later occupied by Gen- 
eral Prentiss's (6th) division formed of new regi- 
ments as they arrived. When reference is here- 



58 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

after made to Sherman's division, in the action of 
Sunday, it is to be understood that Stuart's brigade 
is not included for the reasons explained. 

Still another explanation is needed. When Gen- 
eral Sherman first went into camp special attention 
was paid to the selection of camping sites conven- 
ient to good water. By consulting the map it will 
be seen that three brigades of this division were 
camped somewhat irregularly, the left brigade be- 
ing out of line with the other brigades and also out 
of line in itself. As a consequence when line of 
battle was formed on Sunday morning it was not a 
prolonged line, the left of Hildebrand's brigade 
being well forward and in an open field where it 
was peculiarly exposed to the force of the first onset 
to which it quickly yielded as will be seen. 

At a little after seven o'clock, and after line of 
battle had been formed, General Sherman and staff 
rode to the left of his division in Rhea Field for a 
better view to the front; and while there in front 
of the 53d Ohio regiment (Col. Appier) the Confed- 
erate skirmishers opened fire from the brush across 
Shiloh Branch, killing the general's orderly. At 
about eight o'clock, looking off to the "left front", 
there were seen "the glistening bayonets of masses 
of infantry", and then, for the first time, General 
Sherman was convinced that "the enemy designed 
a determined attack." 47 A few minutes later the 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 59 



Confederate advance struck Sherman's left under 
Colonel Hildebrand, and Prentiss's right under Col- 
onel Peabody. How Prentiss 's division met the at- 
tack has already been stated. How Sherman 's divi- 
sion met it will now be shown. 

The 53d Ohio, exposed as has been explained, and 
commanded, unfortunately, by an officer whose 
nerve deserted him at the critical moment, after 
firing two volleys, became demoralized and as an 
organization disappeared, though two companies 
were rallied by their officers, joined other organiza- 
tions and staid on the firing line throughout the 
day. Colonel Appier disappeared from the field 
and was later cashiered for cowardice. 

The attack on Sherman's left and center by Cle- 
burne's brigade of Hardee's corps was furious and 
sustained — to be repulsed, however, with heavy 
loss, by Buckland's brigade and the two remaining 
regiments of Hildebrand 's brigade. Cleburne, in 
his official report of this affair, says : ' ' Everywhere 
his musketry and artillery at short range swept the 

open spaces with an iron storm that threatened 

certain destruction to every living thing that would 

dare to cross them Under the terrible fire much 

confusion followed, and a quick and bloody repulse 
was the consequence." 48 

One of Cleburne's regiments (6th Miss.) lost 
three hundred men, killed and wounded, out of 425, 



60 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

and his brigade soon went to pieces. A second as- 
sault was made by Anderson's brigade of Bragg 's 
corps to meet a similar repulse. A third assault 
was made by two brigades of Polk's corps (Rus- 
sell's and Johnson's) joined with the reorganized 
brigades of Cleburne and Anderson and assist- 
ed by Wood on their right. This assault was suc- 
cessful, forcing Sherman from his first line at 
about ten o'clock, and with him one brigade of 
McClernand 's division that had come to his support 
on the left. Sherman 's right brigade ( McDowell 's ) 
was not involved in this engagement for the reason 
that the line of attack crossed its front diagonally 
without bringing it into action; but a little later 
Pond's brigade, from the extreme left of Bragg 's 
corps, appeared in McDowell's front, overlapping 
his right and covering Owl Creek bridge. Orders 
were then given to fall back to the Purdy road, 
and McDowell's camp was abandoned without a 
fight. By this tune Hildebrand's brigade had gone 
to pieces and Hildebrand himself being without a 
command, reported to General McClernand for 
staff duty. In fact this first assault on Sherman's 
line fell mainly upon a single brigade (Buck- 
land's), and it was on the hillside in his front 
where, according to General Lew. Wallace, there 
was "a pavement of dead men", after the fight was 
over. This must be considered one of the conspicu- 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 61 

ous features of Sunday's battle. Time was of the 
utmost importance, to enable the proper formations 
in distant parts of the camp. The needed time was 
secured by the stubborn fight made by Sherman's 
division on its first line ; and it was probably this 
that gained for General Sherman, in the minds of 
some, credit for saving the day. 

It was in the Confederate plan to push its right 
east to the river, turn the Union left, seize the Land- 
ing, and force the army back on Owl Creek where 
it was expected surrender would necessarily follow. 
The stubbornness of the resistance to the Confeder- 
ate left delayed the movement toward the river 
somewhat, though two brigades (Chalmers's and 
Jackson's) were in front of the Union left near the 
mouth of Lick Creek, very soon after the extreme 
right fell back from the first line. To meet these 
two brigades of nine regiments and two batteries, 
Colonel Stuart had a single brigade of three regi- 
ments without artillery — and one of these regi- 
ments (71st Ohio) was led oft' the field by its 
colonel soon after the fight began, to take no further 
part in the day's battle. Colonel Mason was later 
cashiered for his conduct at Shiloh. 

The two remaining regiments of this brigade 
gave a good account of themselves (55th Illinois 
and 54th Ohio), making heroic resistance and suf- 
fering severely in casualties. There are those who 



62 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

believe that the fighting on the extreme left by this 
little band of about eight hundred men without 
artillery and against three or four times their num- 
ber with artillery was not less important than was 
the fighting on the extreme right, though less con- 
spicuous. This movement of the Confederate 
right was under the personal direction of General 
Johnston, and upon its quick success depended the 
success of the battle as planned. Before eleven 
o'clock the battle was raging from right to left, a 
distance of three to four miles. 

As has been already stated, by the time that the 
battle was fairly on at the front every regiment in 
the most distant parts of the camp was in line. 
McClernand promptly supported Sherman, and 
Hurlbut also sent one of his brigades (Veatch's) to 
that part of the field, leading his two remaining 
brigades to support Prentiss. Hurlbut, meeting 
Prentiss 's division falling back in disorder, allowed 
the men to drift through his ranks, then formed 
line at the Peach Orchard, facing Lauman's bri- 
gade west and Williams's brigade south, where he 
met first the attack of Chalmers's and Jackson's 
brigades from the direction of Prentiss's aban- 
doned camp. A little later this position was attacked 
by the brigades of Bowen, Statham, Stephens, and 
Gladden — the latter officer, however, having re- 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 63 



ceived a mortal wound in front of Prentiss's first 
line, as already stated. 

C. F. Smith's (2nd) division, now commanded by 
"W. H. L. Wallace, camped near the Landing, and 
fully three miles from the point where the battle 
began, was in line by eight o'clock, and the first 
brigade of four regiments (Colonel Tuttle) ad- 
vanced to Duncan Field and took position in the 
" sunken road" — long abandoned as useless, but 
which ere nightfall was destined to become famous 
for desperate fighting against odds (Map III). 
Of the second brigade (General McArthur's) one 
regiment was sent to the right; two were sent to 
cover Snake Creek bridge, over which General 
Lew. Wallace's division was expected at an early 
hour; and two marched under General McArthur 
himself, to the support of Stuart, on the extreme 
left. The third brigade (Sweeny's) moved south 
on the Corinth road to act as a reserve, though it 
was not permitted to wait upon opportunity. Two 
regiments of this brigade (7th and 58th Illinois) 
were sent at once to the right to prolong Tuttle 's 
line to connect with McClernand, going into posi- 
tion at about nine-thirty o 'clock. A third regiment 
(50th Illinois) was sent to McArthur on the left; 
and the remaining regiment of the brigade (8th 
Iowa), between eleven and twelve o 'clock, took posi- 
tion at Tuttle 's left in the " sunken road" connect- 



64 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

ing its left with Prentiss who, having rallied a part 
of his division, put them in at the right of Hurlbut. 
Prentiss was here joined under fire by the 23d Mis- 
souri, just landed from the boats, giving him about 
one thousand men in the "Hornets' Nest". Two 
other regiments (15th and 16th Iowa), assigned to 
Prentiss's division, landing too late to join him at 
his camp, were sent to McClernand, joining him at 
Jones's Field, one and a half miles west of the 
Landing. 

Before noon the contending armies were in con- 
tinuous and compact line from flank to flank. 
Welded in the furnace heat of four hours' battle 
without a moment's respite, it might be said with 
little exaggeration that the men stood foot to foot, 
contending for the mastery. The Union lines had 
steadily but slowly receded, shortening at the flanks, 
and the Confederates had as steadily advanced, 
extending their flanks but recoiling again and again 
from attacks made at the center, and with heavy 
loss. 

The Confederate reserve under General Breck- 
enridge, about 8,500 men, were all in action before 
noon, the first brigade (Trabue) going in on their 
extreme left at about the time that Sherman fell 
back from his first line. The other two brigades 
(Bowen and Statham) went into line on the right, 
south of the Peach Orchard, between eleven and 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 65 

twelve o'clock, in front of Hurlbut and near where 
General Johnston had his headquarters in the sad- 
dle. Though General Johnston personally directed 
the battle on the Confederate side, in this part of the 
field, he did not, as some writers have told the story, 
personally encourage an unwilling Tennessee regi- 
ment by riding along the line and tapping the bay- 
onets of the men with a tin cup which he carried in 
his hand, then leading the line in a furious charge. 
No part of such an incident occurred there or else- 
where, on the authority of one of General John- 
ston's chief Aids, Governor Harris of Tennessee — 
the only person who was present at the death of 
General Johnston soon after, and near the spot 
where the incident is said to have occurred. 

Stuart, McArthur, and Hurlbut having success- 
fully repulsed several attacks, General Johnston 
was evidently convinced that the Union left was not 
to be easily turned; and so about noon under his 
personal direction, having put into his lines two 
brigades of the reserve under General Brecken- 
ridge, a forward movement was ordered, six bri- 
gades participating — Chalmers 's, Jackson 's, Bow- 
en 's, Statham's, Stephens's, and Gladden 's. Threat- 
ened on his left by a cavalry flanking movement, 
Stuart was the first slowly to give ground; Mc- 
Arthur, on Stuart's right, necessarily followed, 
both changing front from south to southeast, falling 



66 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

back and fighting for every foot of ground. This 
movement compelled Hurlbut to retire from his 
first position to the north side of the Peach Or- 
chard (Map IV). At about two o'clock, Colonel 
Stuart having been wounded, his two regiments 
having lost heavily, and having exhausted their 
ammunition — even after robbing the cartridge- 
boxes of their dead and wounded comrades — re- 
tired toward the Landing. General McArthur 
followed not long after ; and General Hurlbut, hav- 
ing connected his right with General Prentiss's 
left, swung back until their lines were nearly at 
right angles (Map V). Hurlbut retired toward 
the Landing at about four or four-thirty o'clock, 
leaving the line from left to right in the following- 
order: Prentiss's command, 8th Iowa of Sweeny's 
brigade, Tuttle's full brigade, and the 58th Illinois 
of Sweeny's brigade. 

While this fierce struggle was in progress on the 
Confederate right, at about two-thirty afternoon, 
General Johnston received the wound from which 
he died a few minutes later. General Bragg then 
took command of the right, and General Ruggles 
succeeded Bragg in the center. 

While the battle raged on the Union left, as des- 
cribed, it was not less stubborn and bloody on the 
right; but Sherman and McClernand were forced 
back to the Hamburg and Savannah road — a mile 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 67 

from the Landing — about four-thirty o'clock, the 
Confederates gradually closing in from both flanks 
around the center (Map VI). Meantime General 
W. H. L. Wallace had sent orders for his command 
to retire ; but for some reason never explained four 
of his six regiments did not receive the order and 
were captured, as will be explained. As General 
Wallace and General Tuttle, followed by the 2nd 
and 7th Iowa Regiments, were fighting their way 
through a severe crossfire at short range, General 
Wallace was mortally wounded, and was left on the 
field to be recovered the next day, dying three or 
four days later without recovering consciousness. 

THE HORNETS' NEST 

This appellation owes its origin to the men who 
felt the sting of the hornets. William Preston 
Johnston in his history of his father (General A. S. 
Johnston) speaks of the term as a "mild met- 
aphor", and says that "no figure of speech would be 
too strong to express the deadly peril of an assault 
upon this natural fortress whose inaccessible bar- 
riers blazed for six hours with sheets of flame, and 
whose infernal gates poured forth a murderous 
storm of shot and shell and musket-fire which no 
living thing could quell or withstand". 49 

No more graphic description of the fight at the 
Hornets' Nest has been written than that of which 



68 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

the language quoted is a part — written from the 
view-point of the attacking forces, and, therefore, 
written with full knowledge of the results that fol- 
lowed from the " murderous storm of shot and shell 
and musket-fire." It is literally true that Duncan 
Field and the woods and thickets bordering it along 
the "sunken road" were thickly strewn with the 
dead and wounded. The same author tells us that 
"Hindman's brilliant brigades .... were shivered 
into fragments and paralyzed" ; that Stewart's reg- 
iments .... retired mangled from the field"; that 
"Gibson's splendid brigade .... recoiled and fell 
back" — four several times, indeed. Colonel Gib- 
son, in his official report says of his brigade : ' ' Four 
times the position was charged and four times the 
assault proved unavailing." 

The best informed writer, living or dead, on the 
details and incidents of the Battle of Shiloh — Ma- 
jor D. W. Reed, Secretary and Historian of the 
Shiloh National Military Park Commission and 
author of Campaigns and Battles Twelfth Regiment 
Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infantry, who was himself 
in the Nest during the entire day, says there were 
"twelve separate and distinct charges" made upon 
the line at the Hornets' Nest, with the result that 
three Confederate brigades were "entirely disor- 
ganized", and that "thirteen regiments lost their 
regimental organizations .... and were not brought 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 69 

into the fight again .... during the day. ' ' 50 Gen- 
eral Ruggles, who commanded the Confederate 
lines in that part of the field after the death of Gen- 
eral Johnston, designates this as "one of the con- 
trolling conflicts of that eventful day." 51 The 
position was of such conspicuous importance that a 
brief description of the ground will not be out of 
place. 

Moving out on the Corinth road from the Land- 
ing about three-fourths of a mile one crosses the 
Hamburg and Savannah road. A fourth of a mile 
further on the road forks, the left-hand branch 
(Eastern Corinth) bearing south of southwest; and 
one-fourth of a mile still further on it crosses an old 
abandoned road near the southeast corner of Dun- 
can Field, and near the center of the Hornets' Nest. 
The right-hand road from the fork runs nearly 
west, crossing the north end of Duncan Field, then 
bearing south passes the "Little Log Meeting- 
house". At the point where this road, going from 
the Landing, strikes the east line of Duncan Field 
the abandoned road leads off to the southeast about 
a half-mile, then bending east to the Hamburg and 
Savannah road near Bloody Pond — another sig- 
nificant local name. Along this abandoned road, 
beginning near the north end of Duncan Field, the 
line of battle from right to left, was as follows: 
58th Illinois (Sweeny's brigade) ; second, seventh, 



70 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

twelfth, and fourteenth Iowa regiments (Tuttle's 
brigade) ; to the left of this brigade was the eighth 
Iowa, of Sweeny's brigade; to the left still was 
Prentiss's division, consisting of one entire regi- 
ment (23d Missouri), and parts of several other 
regiments — the entire line numbering not to ex- 
ceed 2,500 men. The old road ran along a slight 
elevation and was so water-washed in places as to 
afford good shelter to men lying down to fire on an 
advancing enemy — a sort of natural rifle-pit, 
though rather shallow in places. About half of the 
distance, from right to left, there was open field 
extending to the front about 500 yards to the timber 
occupied by the Confederates. The left half of the 
line was well screened by timber and, for the most 
part, by a heavy growth of underbrush so that the 
advancing lines not able to see the men lying in the 
old road were received with a crushing fire at short 
range. In every instance the repulse was complete 
and bloody. 

General Ruggles, becoming convinced that the 
position could not be taken by infantry, from the 
front, determined to concentrate his artillery and 
bombard the strong-hold. He tells us in his official 
report 52 that he directed his staff officers ' ' to bring- 
forward all the field guns they could collect from 
the left toward the right". General Ruggles evi- 
dently believed that this was a crisis in the battle, 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 71 



admitting that ' ' for a brief period the enemy appar- 
ently gained". Nor was he alone in the belief, for 
one of his artillery officers (Captain Sandidge) said 
officially: "I have no doubt that had they been 
seasonably reinforced when they checked our ad- 
vancing troops, they could certainly have broken 
our lines". And he feared that result before the 
guns could be planted and infantry supports 
brought up. General Ruggles succeeded in bring- 
ing up sixty-two guns from the left, which were 
planted on the west side of Duncan Field about five 
hundred yards away ; and the bombardment began 
at about four-thirty afternoon. Of course there 
could be but one result. The Union batteries were 
forced to retire, leaving the way clear for the en- 
circling Confederate lines to close in. Besides the 
Ruggles aggregation of artillery of sixty-two guns, 
there must have been several other batteries playing 
upon the Hornets' Nest from the right, as none of 
the guns from that part of the field were in the 
Ruggles aggregation. Probably not less than sev- 
enty-five guns were trained on that devoted spot, 
and fully three-fourths of the Confederate army 
was coiling around it. And for some time before 
the surrender took place, a few minutes before six 
o'clock, rifle-fire poured in from three directions, as 
the beleagured faced about and attempted to fight 
their way out, The number to surrender was about 



72 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

2,000 men. The importance of this prolonged con- 
test, from a little before ten forenoon to nearly six 
afternoon, upon the destinies of the day can hardly 
be estimated. It secured to General Grant's army 
the thing most needed — time to form the new line ; 
time for Lew. Wallace, for Buell, and for Night to 
come. The Hornets' Nest was distinctly an altar 
of sacrifice (Map VI). 

HOW BUELL SAVED THE DAY 

By the time the Confederate officers had re- 
covered from their " surprise" at the smallness of 
the capture at the Hornets' Nest, in view of the 
prolonged and effective resistance encountered, 
General Grant had formed his new line on the north 
side of Dill Branch, running from the mouth of the 
Branch on a curve back to the road leading from 
the Landing ; thence west to the Hamburg and Sa- 
vannah road ; thence north to the swamp bordering 
Snake Creek. At the extreme left of the line, the 
two gunboats lay opposite the mouth of the Branch. 
On the bluffs near the mouth of the Branch were 
two batteries, trained up-stream. Two other bat- 
teries were a little farther from the river and back 
nearer the road leading from the Landing ; and two 
more were still farther west, but advanced toward 
the edge of the bluffs overlooking the Branch. Back 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 73 

on the road again and a little west were two more 
batteries before coming to the six big siege guns. 

A glance at the map for Sunday night's position 
will show that the line from the mouth of Dill 
Branch west to the siege guns was a semi-circle 
with the gunboats at the extreme left, and that there 
were about fifty guns in the line east of the Ham- 
burg and Savannah road, exclusive of the gunboats. 
Behind this array of artillery was ample infantry 
support, except on the extreme left where support 
was not needed, because of the nature of the ground 
in front. As General Nelson marched the head of 
his column up from the Landing at about five- thirty 
o'clock, he noted the absence of infantry along that 
part of the line, and in his official report he de- 
scribes what he saw as a "semicircle of artillery, 
totally unsupported by infantry", which was not 
quite true ; and he added another statement which 
was not at all true, namely; "the left of the artil- 
lery was completely turned by the enemy and the 
gunners fled from their pieces." 53 General Nelson 
evidently knew nothing of the batteries near the 
mouth of Dill Branch, for he struck the line at about 
the middle of the "semicircle" and the single regi- 
ment that he brought into action (36th Indiana) 
was sent to support the guns in front of the main 
line toward Dill Branch. 

Opposed to this array of Union artillery a single 



74 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

Confederate battery took part in the last attack, 
and that was disabled. 

Any fair-minded person, having knowledge of 
the character of the ground between the lines of the 
two armies as the lines were on Sunday night — es- 
pecially on the left of the Union lines — must ad- 
mit that Grant's was a strong position and that his 
antagonist had serious obstacles to overcome before 
he could strike with effect. 

With as little delay as possible after the sur- 
render at the Hornets' Nest, General Bragg, still 
commanding the Confederate right, ordered his 
division commanders to "drive the enemy into the 
river", believing, doubtless, that the "drive" would 
be a brief and easy task. Accordingly the Confed- 
erate right uncoiled itself from around the Hornets' 
Nest and, led by Chalmers's and Jackson's bri- 
gades of Withers 's division, advanced along the 
road toward the Landing ; then, filing right, formed 
line on the south side of Dill Branch and near the 
margin of the deep ravine. This ravine, impass- 
able at its mouth by reason of steep bluffs and back- 
water, was difficult to pass fully a half-mile from 
its mouth. Its steep sides were timbered and ob- 
structed by underbrush, and at the bottom it was 
fairly choked with undergrowth. 

The last attack made upon the Union lines was 
upon the extreme left in which only two small bri- 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 75 



gades and one battery participated. Chalmers's 
brigade bad nominally five regiments, but one of 
the regiments (52nd Tennessee) ''acted badly" in 
the early part of the day, and three hundred of its 
four hundred men are not to be counted. Jackson 's 
brigade detached one regiment to guard the Horn- 
ets ' Nest prisoners, so that it seems to be liberal, 
allowing for the losses of the day, to say that there 
were not to exceed 1800 men engaged in the last 
assault. 

The two brigades made their way down the south- 
ern slope, through the tangled undergrowth at the 
bottom of the ravine and, quoting from their official 
reports, "struggled" up the other slope, " which 
was very steep" encountering in "attempting to 
mount the last ridge" the "fire from a whole line 
of batteries protected by infantry and assisted by 
shells from the gunboats." General Chalmers says 
his men "were too much exhausted to storm the bat- 
teries". 5 * 

General Jackson says his men were without am- 
munition, having "only their bayonets to rely on", 
and that when "they arrived near the crest of the 
opposite hill", they "could not be urged farther 
without support", the men "sheltering themselves 
against the precipitous sides of the ravine" where 
' ' they remained under fire for some time. ' ' ( The 



76 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

Confederate skirmish line is shown on Map VI, at 
the crest of the bluff, north of Dill Branch.) 

This was the situation when eight companies of 
the 36th Indiana (Colonel Grose), about four hun- 
dred men, of Ammen's brigade, Nelson's division, 
Army of the Ohio, arrived on the scene. Colonel 
Grose was ordered to go to the support of Stone's 
battery, which was in position some distance in ad- 
vance of Grant's main line and near the brow of the 
hill up which the assailants were climbing with 
great difficulty. There the 36th Indiana exchanged 
shots with the skirmishers of Chalmers's brigade, 
during fifteen to thirty minutes 56 having one man 
killed and one man wounded. In his history of the 
36th Indiana, Colonel Grose says that "after three 
or four rounds the enemy fell back. It was then 
dark." And he says, further, that "no part of 
Buell's army, except the Thirty-sixth Indiana, took 
any part whatever in the Sunday evening fight at 
Shiloh." And he might have said with equal truth 
and without disparagement to his regiment that the 
presence of the Thirty-sixth Indiana had no effect 
in determining the issues of the day. Had the four 
hundred men not been there the "enemy" would 
have retired just the same, for he could never have 
crossed the open space from the "last ridge" to the 
' ' line of batteries ' '. The ground to be traversed was 
but gently rolling with little to obstruct the view — 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 77 

no sheltering ridge or friendly copse to admit of 
unobserved approach. It must have been a ' ' rush ' ' 
of two to four hundred yards, in the face of point- 
blank firing, to reach the batteries, behind which, 
as already stated, was ample infantry support. 
The battle of the day really came to an end at the 
Hornets' Nest. All that followed was mere skir- 
mishing for the purpose of developing the new con- 
ditions. 

THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 

The "Lost Opportunity" is a phrase of Confed- 
erate origin and it refers to the last moments of 
Sunday's battle, briefly described above. Both the 
idea and the phrase seem to have been born of an 
afterthought, and a disposition to shift blame to 
the shoulders of General Beauregard, should 
blame be imputed, for failure to crush or capture 
Grant's army. The claim has been put forward 
with considerable persistency that the order of Gen- 
eral Beauregard to withdraw from the contest was 
responsible for the escape of Grant's army. This 
absurd claim has been answered most effectively 
by General Thomas Jordan, Adjutant-General of 
the Confederate forces engaged at Shiloh. 

In Southern Historical Society Papers, 57 General 
Jordan takes up the subject and refers to the offi- 
cial reports of several division, brigade, and regi- 



78 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

mental commanders for the purpose of showing 
the demoralized and exhausted condition of the 
Confederate army. In referring to the report of 
General Withers, two brigades of whose division 
made the last feeble assault, he says : "If there be 
significance in words, he makes it clear that such 
was the absolute lateness of the hour, that had the 
attempt been made to carry the Federal batteries 
.... with such troops as were there assembled, it 
would have resulted in an awful butchery and dis- 
persion of all employed in so insensate, so prepos- 
terous an undertaking ; and such must be the verdict 
of any military man who may studiously read the 
reports of the subordinate officers of Withers 's 
three brigades, and bear in mind the formidable 
line of fifty-odd pieces of artillery which Webster 
had improvised ' \ 58 

Surgeon J. C. Nott of General Bragg 's staff, who 
rode by his chief's side nearly all day, is quoted as 
saying that the "men .... were too much demoral- 
ized and indisposed to advance in the face of the 
shells .... bursting over us in every direction, and 
my impression was .... that our troops had done all 
that they would do, and had better be withdrawn. ' ' 59 

Another officer of General Bragg 's staff, Colonel 
Urquhart, writing in 1880 is quoted thus: "The 
plain truth must be told, that our troops at the 
front were a thin line of exhausted men, who were 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 79 

making no further headway Several years of 

subsequent service have impressed me that General 
Beauregard's order for withdrawing the troops was 
most timely". 60 

The claim that there was a "Lost Opportunity" 
because of the order to retire, General Jordan says, 
"becomes simply shameful, under the light of the 
closely contemporaneous statements of every divi- 
sion commander, except one (Withers) ; of all the 
brigade and regimental commanders of each Con- 
federate corps, including the reserve whose reports 
have reached the light ; that is, of nearly all com- 
manders present in the battle. ' ' C1 

This ought to be sufficient evidence to settle for- 
ever both propositions in the negative ; namely, the 
claim that Buell "saved the day", and that there 
was a "Lost Opportunity". 

The condition of Grant's army at the close of 
Sunday's battle as to strength has been greatly 
underrated by certain writers, and its disorganiza- 
tion has been greatly exaggerated by writers who 
have had an object in so representing it. It is true 
that both armies were badly battered as the result 
of about fourteen hours' continuous fighting with 
scarcely a moment 's cessation. Careful study of the 
reports of Confederate officers shows that there 
was not a single point of attack on any part of the 
field at any hour of the day where there was not 



80 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

stubborn resistance with serious loss to the attack- 
ing forces. These reports also show that there was 
serious defection from their ranks, beginning early 
and continuing during the day, and that when night 
came on there was such disorganization that some 
of their commanders were entirely separated from 
their commands and remained so separated to the 
close of the battle, Monday night. These reports 
further show that instead of bivouacking in line of 
battle as did Grant's army the entire Confederate 
army, with the exception of a single brigade 
(Pond's brigade on the extreme left) withdrew a 
distance of two to four miles from the Landing. It 
is in evidence also from the same sources of infor- 
mation that General Beauregard was able to put in 
line on the morning of the second day substantially 
half the number of men that were in line on the 
morning of the first day. General Grant was able 
to put in line about the same proportion, exclusive 
of the reinforcements that came up during the 
night. 

There are no means of determining the compara- 
tive casualties in the two armies on the first day, 
but there is no reason for doubting that they were 
substantially equal — exclusive of the capture at 
the Hornets' Nest. It is known, however, that the 
casualties among field officers, from the grade of 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 81 

colonel upward, were greater in the Union than in 
the Confederate army in Sunday's battle. 

Much has been said about the "stragglers" from 
the Union lines crowding the Landing and ' ' cower- 
ing" under the river bluffs — and w r ith about the 
same degree of exaggeration as certain writers have 
indulged in their descriptions of the opening of 
the battle. There were "stragglers" from both 
armies, and there is no reason to doubt that the 
numbers were substantially equal. It is true, how- 
ever, that the straggling was more in evidence on 
the Union side, for the very good reason that it was 
more concentrated — confined to a limited area 
about the Landing — while on the other side there 
was unlimited room for expansion and scattering 
over miles of territory. This remark applies with 
equal force to other features of the crowded condi- 
tion near the Landing, late in the day. Hundreds 
of teamsters with their four-mule and six-mule 
teams were there because it was the only place of 
safety for one of the essential parts of the army's 
equipment ; the sick from the regimental hospitals 
and company tents were there — several hundred 
of them — because there was no other place to go ; 
and hundreds of wounded were there from the front, 
together with a force of hospital attendants. Add 
these together and you have several thousand with- 
out counting a single "straggler". These things 



82 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

are never considered by critics who have a cause to 
support. Every large army requires a small army 
to care for it, who are, necessarily, noncombatants. 

BUELL COMES ON THE FIELD 

By General Orders of March 31st, General 
Grant's headquarters were transferred from Sa- 
vannah to Pittsburg Landing; but a headquarters' 
office was continued at the former place for conven- 
ience up to the day of the battle, and General Grant 
passed between the two places every day, or nearly 
every day, on the headquarters' boat, Tigress. On 
Sunday morning, at Savannah, an "early break- 
fast" had been ordered, as it was General Grant's 
purpose to ride out with his staff to meet General 
Buell, whose arrival the evening before was not 
known. While at breakfast, firing was heard in the 
direction of Pittsburg Landing — "the breakfast 
was left unfinished" and General Grant and staff 
went directly to the boat and steamed rapidly up 
the river, stopping at Crump's Landing to order 
General Lew. Wallace to hold his division in readi- 
ness for marching orders. 

Before leaving Savannah General Grant sent to 
General Nelson of Buell's army, the following or- 
der: "An attack having been made on our forces, 
you will move j^our entire command to the river op- 
posite Pittsburg". 62 A similar order was sent to 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 83 

General Wood, commanding another division of 
Buell's army, not yet arrived at Savannah, to move 
"with the utmost dispatch to the river" at Savan- 
nah, where boats would meet him. The following 
note was left for General Buell whose presence in 
Savannah was not known to General Grant : 

Savannah, April 6, 1862 
General D. C. Buell : 

Heavy firing is heard up the river, indicating plainly that 
an attack has been made on our most advanced positions. I 
have been looking for this, but did not believe that the attack 
could be made before Monday or Tuesday. This necessitates 
my joining the forces up the river instead of meeting you today, 
as I had contemplated. I have directed General Nelson to 
move to the river with his division. He can march to opposite 
Pittsburg. 

Respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant 
Major-General Commanding. 63 

This note clearly shows that General Grant, in 
common with his division commanders, was expect- 
ing an early attack. 

As soon as General Grant, after arriving on the 
field, learned the true situation, he sent a staff of- 
ficer with another order to General Nelson: "you 
will hurry up your command as fast as possible. 
All looks well but it is necessary for you to push 
forward as fast as possible". 64 Later still, prob- 
ably about noon though it may have been later, 
nothing having been heard either from Buell or 



84 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

Nelson, General Grant sent another hurry-up order 
addressed to the "Commanding Officer Advance 
Forces (Buell 's Army) ' '. This order was delivered 
to General Buell on the boat as he was going to the 
Landing. He arrived at the Landing, he tells us in 
Shiloh Reviewed, about 1 o'clock, though Villard, 
who claims to have been on the same boat, makes 
the time later, between 5 and 6 o'clock, about the 
time that Nelson's advance crossed the river. And 
there are certain features of Buell 's official report 
which, in the absence of a definite statement on the 
point, make Villard 's claim as to the hour at least 
plausible. 

General Grant's first order to General Nelson 
must have been received as early as 7 o'clock — 
probably earlier, for Nelson had the order when 
General Buell, after hearing the firing, went to 
General Grant's headquarters for information, 
where he learned that the latter had "just started 
for the Landing". 65 

General Nelson in his official report does not state 
the hour of receiving the order to march, but says 
that he "left Savannah, by order of General Grant, 
reiterated by General Buell in person, at 1.30 p. 
m. " 66 The language is a little ambiguous, but it 
doubtless means that the order was "reiterated" 
about noon or later and that the march began at 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 85 

one-thirty, afternoon. 67 (Colonel Ammen says at 
one, afternoon.) 

Villard, heretofore quoted, says that Nelson re- 
ceived Grant's order about noon, by which he prob- 
ably means the "reiterated" order. In any event 
it appears that General Buell "held up" the order 
to Nelson fully five hours and then "reiterated" it. 
Why did General Buell do that ? Why did General 
Nelson wait to have the order ' ' reiterated ' ' ? Why 
did he not obey the original order regardless of any 
dilatory order from General Buell, since the con- 
tingency had arisen under which by General Hal- 
leck's instructions General Grant was "authorized 
to take the general command" of both armies; 
namely, an attack upon his own army ? Had Gen- 
eral Nelson marched under the original order, his 
division would have been on the field at about the 
time that it started on the ten-mile march. What 
might have been the effect of throwing 4,500 fresh 
men in the scale of battle, then hanging in doubtful 
poise, is, of course, conjectural — and it must be 
left to conjecture, though there is little room for 
doubt. 

General Nelson's entire division was across the 
river soon after dark. Advancing a little to the 
front on the extreme left it bivouacked for the night. 
A little later General Lew. Wallace came up on the 
extreme right, his division numbering about 5,000 



86 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

men; but having to counter-march the division in 
order to bring the regiments in proper position 
his formation was not completed until after mid- 
night when it went into bivouack. 

During Sunday night Crittenden's division of 
Buell's army (two brigades) came up by boat, and 
in the morning two brigades of McCook's division 
arrived, to be joined about noon by another brigade. 
Wood's division, which was about thirty miles 
away when the battle began, arrived on the field at 
about two afternoon Monday, when the battle was 
about over. The total additions to the Union lines 
up to noon on Monday was approximately 20,000 
men. 

During Sunday's battle General Grant passed 
from point to point behind the firing line, meeting 
and consulting with his division commanders and 
carefully observing the movements of the contend- 
ing forces, for, as has already been stated, there was 
no point on the field from which general observa- 
tions could be made. On Monday he commanded 
his own army, giving no orders to General Buell, 
the latter exercising independent command. Why 
General Grant did not assiune "general command" 
of both armies we might fairly conjecture (if con- 
jecture were necessary) to be due to the attitude of 
General Buell toward Grant's order to Nelson on 
Sunda}^ morning — treating it as invalid until "re- 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 87 



iterated" by himself. There is no room for con- 
jecture in the matter, however, for General Buell 
says in his Shiloh Reviewed™: "I did not look 
upon him [Grant] as my commander". There is 
evidence also that Buell was disposed to treat the 
subject of Sunday's battle as something of a sham 
— that the resistance to the Confederate attacks 
was not particularly strenuous. General Tuttle of 
Grant's army, acted on Monday as reserve to Gen- 
eral Buell, having under his command the two Iowa 
Regiments that cut their way out of the Hornets' 
Nest on Sunday, and one or two other regiments of 
Grant's army. General Tuttle relates that "while 
passing over the field, April 7th", following up the 
advancing lines, "General Buell taunted me with 
not having done any fighting that amounted to any- 
thing [on Sunday]." When they came to the 
"clearing" in front of the Hornets' Nest and saw 
the ground strewn with dead, Buell "was compelled 
to confess that there must have been terrible fight- 
ing". Had General Buell passed over the ground 
at the Peach Orchard and over the slope in front 
of Sherman's first line, he would have found sim- 
ilar conditions t< > those in the ' * clearing ' ' in front of 
the Hornets' Nest, His estimate of the vigor of the 
Confederate attacks on Sunday was probably based 
upon the feeble attack made by exhausted men 



88 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

which he himself saw near the Landing on Sunday 
night. 

In Monday's battle General Buell's army consti- 
tuted the left and General Grant's the right, with 
General Lew. Wallace's fresh division occupying 
the extreme right of the line — and it is worth men- 
tioning here that at least two of Grant's regiments 
were sent before the battle was over to the extreme 
left, and one of them, under command of General 
Nelson, made a bayonet charge across an open field. 
Another of Grant's regiments, under Crittenden 
and near the center, charged and captured a battery. 
In neither case was it necessary for General Grant 
to "reiterate" the requisite orders. 

As to the outcome of the contest on Monday there 
could be no doubt, with the large accession to the 
ranks of the Union army — a force nearly equal to 
the number of men that the Confederates were able 
to put in line. General Grant had instructed his 
division commanders on Sunday night to be ready 
to attack early in the morning, and General Buell 
ordered his divisions "to move forward as soon as 
it was light". Artillery fire began nearly at the 
same time — about five-thirty — on the extreme 
flanks of the Union army, though the lines were not 
in contact until about eight o 'clock. It would not be 
correct to characterize the movements of the Union 
lines on Monday as General Beauregard character- 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 89 

ized the movements of the Confederate lines on 
Sunday — the figure of the " Alpine avalanche" 
would not apply to the movements of either day. 
However, the Union lines moved forward without 
serious repulses at any point, though there were 
some reverses on the left. The Confederates held 
their ground with stubbornness, occupying the line 
of the Purdy road until about noon. By two o 'clock 
the battle was practically over, and an hour later 
the Confederates were in full retreat. Map No. 
VII will give a good idea of the general movements 
on Monday. There was no general pursuit of the 
defeated army — just enough to be sure that it was 
a retreat in fact. The lack of pursuit was not, how- 
ever, because Grant lacked "the energy to order a 
pursuit", as John Codman Ropes alleges, but be- 
cause Halleck's instructions did not permit pur- 
suit ; 69 hands were still "tied". 

NUMBERS ENGAGED AND LOSSES 

There are two methods of estimating the strength 
of an army — one method excludes all noncombat- 
ants, the other includes noncombatants as essential 
parts of the army. On the inclusive method, the 
Historian and Secretary of the Shiloh National 
Military Park Commission 70 gives the strength of 
Grant's five divisions on Sunday at 39,830, and that 
of Johnston's army at 43,968. 71 In a note 72 in which 



90 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 



lie excludes noncombatants, the estimate is 33,000 
and 40,000 respectively. The figures last given cor- 
respond with the estimates of the two commanders 
— Grant in his Memoirs, and Johnston in his dis- 
patch from Corinth, when about to march . In 
artillery, Johnston had one hundred and twenty- 
eight guns and Grant one hundred and twelve. Had 
Wallace's division come upon the field early on 
Sunday the two armies would have been very evenly 
matched, both in men and guns. On the second day, 
including noncombatants and "stragglers", the 
figures given are: Union, 54,592; Confederate, 
34,000." The complete and accurate losses of the 
respective armies for the respective days have never 
been, and cannot be, stated. The losses of Grant's 
army by divisions, two days (except 3d division one 
day) were as follows: 



1st division. MeClernand 



2nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
6th 
Unassigned 



W. H. L. Wallace 
Lew. Wallace 
Hurlbut . . 
Sherman . . 
Prentiss . . 



Med 


Wounded 


Prisoners 


Total 


285 


1,372 


85 


1,742 


270 


1,173 


1,306 


2,749 


41 


251 


4 


296 


317 


1,441 


111 


1,869 


325 


1,277 


299 


1,901 


236 


928 


1.008 


2,172 


39 


159 


17 


215 



Total Army Tenn 1,513 6,601 2,830 10,944 74 

Army of the Ohio, Monday — 75 

2nd division 88 823 7 918 

4th " 93 603 20 716 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 91 

Killed Wounded Prisoners Total 

5th " 60 377 28 465 

6th " 4 .. 4 

Total 241 1,807 55 2,103 

Grand total 1,754 8,408 2,885 13,047 

Army of Miss. (Confederate) 1,728 8,012 959 10,699 76 

The killed in the two days' battle are almost ex- 
actly equal; the wounded are in excess by nearly 
four hundred, in the Union army ; and there was in 
the Union army an excess in prisoners, of 1,926. 
Eliminating the prisoners taken in the Hornets' 
Nest, it appears that more prisoners were taken in 
the open field by the Union army than by the Con- 
federates. The loss in officers in Grant's army on 
Sunday from the grade of colonel up was much 
heavier than in the Confederate army — forty-five 
in the former to thirty in the latter." 

THE LOST DIVISION 

So much has been written and said about the fail- 
ure of General Wallace to get his division on the 
field and into the fight on the first day of the battle 
that the subject deserves a separate paragraph and 
a map of the roads over which his division marched. 
By reference to the map (No. VIII) it will be seen 
that the division occupied three camps — one bri- 
gade at Crump's Landing; one at Stonylonesome, 
two to three miles west; and one at Adamsville, 
about five miles out from the Landing toward 



92 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

Purdy. There is no dispute about the fact that 
Grant on his way up the river on Sunday morning 
stopped at Crump's Landing to notify Wallace to 
be in readiness for marching orders, though Wal- 
lace makes no mention of the fact in his official re- 
port, leaving it to be inferred that he had no order 
from Grant in the morning. He says that from the 
" continuous cannonading" he "inferred a general 
battle" ; that he was in "anticipation of an order" ; 
and that he ordered his first and third brigades to 
"concentrate" on the second at Stonylonesome. 78 
In his Autobiography General Wallace says that he 
was satisfied before six o'clock, from the firing "up 
the river", that the battle was on; and he says that 
at about seven o 'clock, his concentration of brigades 
began. The official records show that this order 
was not carried out, for the third brigade did not 
move from Adamsville until about two-thirty after- 
noon, when it fell in behind the first and second 
brigades on the march toward Snake Creek bridge, 
and did not join them at Stonylonesome. 

About a year after the Battle of Shiloh, General 
Wallace had occasion to refer to the movements of 
his division, on that Sunday in explaining to the 
Department Commander the reasons for the late- 
ness of his arrival on the field ; and in his explana- 
tion he incidentally referred to Grant's call at 
Crump's Landing on Sunday morning, fixing the 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 93 

time at " about nine o'clock". 79 General Grant and 
the members of bis staff fixed the time at seven to 
seven-thirty o'clock. 

No special importance is to be attached to this 
difference in time, however, for it had no important 
bearing on subsequent events — it is mentioned 
only because it may justify a doubt as to the recol- 
lection of General Wallace in fixing the time at 
which he received final marching orders; namely, 
"11:30 a. m." It was the belief of General Grant 
and members of his staff that the order must have 
been received from a half hour to an hour earlier ; 
though General Wallace's statement is now gener- 
ally accepted. The form of order sent to Wallace 
can never be definitely settled, as it is nowhere a 
matter of record, and the original was lost in the 
hands of General Wallace, or through the fault of 
his Adjutant General. 

During the year after the Battle of Shiloh, there 
was much criticism of General Wallace, to which 
he, of course, made defence. And so General Grant 
requested his Assistant Adjutant General, Colonel 
Rawlins, Colonel McPherson, Halleck's chief en- 
gineer, and Captain Rowley of his staff, each of 
whom had knowledge of General Wallace's move- 
ments on Sunday, to write out in detail their recol- 
lections, to be submitted to the Department Com- 
mander. Each wrote quite fully about one year 



94 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

after the battle, Colonel Rawlins reproducing from 

memory the order dictated by him as he claims, to 

Captain Baxter, which order was carried by the 

latter to Wallace. Following is the order from 

memory : 

Major-General "Wallace : 

You will move forward your division from Crump 's Land- 
ing, leaving a sufficient force to protect the public property at 
that place, to Pittsburg Landing, on the road nearest to and 
parallel with the river, and form in line at right angles with the 
river, immediately in rear of the camp of Maj. Gen. C. F. 
Smith 's division on our right, and there await further orders. 80 

Captain Baxter started by boat to deliver the 
order "not later than nine o'clock", according to 
Colonel Rawlins, and reported back to Grant before 
" 12 o 'clock m." 

In his official report, dated April 12, 1862, Gen- 
eral Wallace says: "At 11:30 o'clock the an- 
ticipated order arrived, directing me to come up 
and take position on the right of the army and form 
my line of battle at a right angle with the river." 81 
Writing a year later to General Halleck, explaining 
the reasons for his late arrival on the field, he said : 
"At exactly 11:30 a. m., a quartermaster by the 
name of Baxter brought me an order in writing un- 
signed by anybody", the bearer of the order ex- 
plaining that he received it verbally and put it in 
writing while on the boat. 

In his Autobiography, General Wallace enlarges 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 95 

somewhat on the subject of this order, and says that 
it was written on paper discolored with tobacco 
stains and bore the imprint of boot-heels; and he 
says that Baxter told him that the paper was picked 
up from the floor of the ladies' cabin, on the steam- 
boat. The original order having been lost, Wallace 
gives the following from memory : 

You will leave a sufficient force at Crump's Landing to 
guard the public property there : with the rest of the division 
inarch and form junction with the right of the army. Form 
line of battle at right angles with the river, and be governed 
by circumstances. 82 

The Rawlins form of order was reproduced from 
memory within one year after the event; that of 
Wallace, many years after — possibly forty years. 
Aside from the precise road mentioned and the pre- 
cise position on the field designated in the Rawlins 
order, the two are strikingly similar — sufficiently 
so to suggest that the former, which had long been 
in print, may have been consulted to refresh the 
memory in preparing the latter. 

Referring again to the events of Sunday as re- 
lated by Colonel RaAvlins, it appears that about an 
hour after Captain Baxter started by boat with 
orders to General Wallace, Grant sent a cavalry 
officer, familiar with the road, with a verbal message 
to Wallace "to hurry forward with all possible dis- 
patch. 1 ' This officer reported back to Grant, be- 



96 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

tween twelve and one o'clock, that Wallace declined 
to move without written orders. According to Rawl- 
ins, Captain Baxter reported back about 12 o'clock ; 
that he delivered the orders to Wallace at about ten 
o'clock; that Wallace read the memorandum hand- 
ed him by Captain Baxter and "appeared de- 
lighted". 83 

Immediately after the report of the cavalry of- 
ficer that Wallace declined to move without written 
orders (Baxter's written order had not yet been 
delivered), Captain Rowley of Grant's staff was 
ordered to take the cavalry officer and two orderlies 
and carry instructions to Wallace, with authority 
to put the instructions in writing and sign them, if 
necessary. 84 

Captain Rowley's account of this incident is more 
in detail than that of Colonel Rawlins. Rowley 
corroborates Rawlins as to the report of the cavalry 
officer and says that Grant, after hearing the re- 
port, turned to him (Rowley) and said : " Captain, 
you will proceed to Crump's Landing and say to 
General Wallace that it is my orders that he bring 
his division up at once, coming up b} r the River road, 
crossing Snake Creek on the bridge". Captain 
Rowley says he was authorized to put the orders 
in writing and properly sign the same, should 
General Wallace require it. He was instructed to 
take the cavalry officer and two orderlies with him 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 97 



with the further instruction: "see that you do not 
spare horse flesh." 85 Captain Rowley gives the 
time of his starting on this mission at about twelve- 
thirty o 'clock. Colonel Rawlins fixes it at " not later 
than 1 o'clock p. m." 

Captain Rowley's party rode directly to Wal- 
lace's headquarters at Crump's Landing, to find 
"no signs of a camp except one baggage wagon 
that was just leaving. " 86 (The brigade had marched 
west to Stonylonesome in the morning.) Getting 
directions from the driver of the wagon, the party 
followed the road taken by Wallace and overtook 
the rear of the division some five or six miles out. 
The division was "at a rest, sitting on each side of 
the road". Riding forward to the head of the col- 
umn, Wallace was found "sitting upon his horse, 
surrounded by his staff". Although it is not so 
stated, it is fair to assume that the division was at 
rest while the cavalry was scouting to the front, as 
Wallace believed that he was approaching the 
crossing of Owl Creek, near the right of the army 
as it was in the morning, and where he might ex- 
pect trouble. 

Captain Rowley delivered his orders and stated 
that it had been reported to Grant that he (Wal- 
lace) had declined to march without written orders, 
which according to Rowley, Wallace denounced as 
a ' ' damned lie!" Wallace claimed that he had taken 



98 ' THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

the "only road he knew anything about," 87 leading 
in the direction of the right of the army. On learn- 
ing the real situation, Wallace ordered his division 
to counter-march for the purpose of reaching the 
river road by a short-cut if possible. Captain Row- 
ley remained with the division, acting as guide. 

When Captain Rowley left the field with orders 
to Wallace, it was supposed that the head of the 
column would be found only a short distance north 
of Snake Creek bridge, and that Wallace would 
soon be in the precise position where he was expect- 
ed to be, and where his presence was most needed. 
Two o'clock came, but no information from Wal- 
lace. Grant then sent two of the principal members 
of his staff, Colonel Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant 
General, and Colonel McPherson, Chief Engineer, 
to find the lost division. 

These officers rode directly to Crump's Landing, 
not knowing whether the division had left its camp. 
Following directions given them there, they came 
upon the division counter-marching on a cross-road 
to the river road, at about three-thirty afternoon. 
Colonel Rawlins repeated to Wallace the reported 
refusal to march without written orders, and Wal- 
lace repeated the denial. In regard to the road 
taken, Wallace said, according to Rawlins, that his 
guide had misled him. 

Soon after Rawlins and McPherson came up with 



tup: BATTLE OF SHILOH 99 



the head of the column it was halted, as Rawlins 
states it, "for a considerable length of time, to en- 
able it to close up and rest". There was another 
delay when near Snake Creek bridge "for full half 
an hour" while changing the position of the artil- 
lery in the column. 88 

The three officers, Rawlins, McPherson, and 
Rowley, agree in stating that the inarch of the col- 
umn was very slow, and that no urging of the terms 
of Grants' order or the seriousness of the situation 
seemed to have any effect. According to Rawlins, 
the speed was less than "a mile and a half an hour" 
after he joined the column, though "the roads were 
in fine condition ; he was marching light ; his men 
Avere in buoyant spirits, .... and eager to get for- 
ward." 89 

Whatever the form of the order from General 
Grant to General Wallace, and however it may have 
been interpreted, Wallace's march began from 
Stonylonesome at twelve o'clock, noon, with two 
brigades, over the Shunpike road toward Owl Creek 
bridge, the third brigade falling in the rear where 
the road intersects f romi Adamsville. Captain Row- 
ley came up to the head of the column "at rest", 
north of and overlooking Clear Creek valley, not 
Owl Creek as Wallace supposed — he was still more 
than three miles from Owl Creek, and the rear of 
the column was still at Adamsville. The counter- 



100 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

march began from the north side of Clear Creek, at 
a point marked "Smith's" (Map VIII). It was 
necessary for the head of the column to march back 
about two and a half miles to find a cross-road, then 
about the same distance on the cross-road, before 
the rear could move ; so it was well along in the af- 
ternoon when the last files of the third brigade left 
Adamsville. Colonel Rawlins and Colonel Mc- 
Pherson came up with Wallace on the cross-road at 
about three-thirty afternoon, as heretofore stated. 

From a glance at the map (VIII) showing the 
roads north of Snake Creek and the relation of the 
roads to the battle field, it appears that the shortest 
possible route from Wallace's camps to the right of 
the army (as it was even on Sunday morning) was 
by the river road and Snake Creek bridge (Wallace 
bridge on map). Not only was the road by Owl 
Creek bridge much longer, but the crossing was 
more hazardous in case the enemy succeeded in se- 
curing the crossing and planting a battery, for the 
approach from the North was through a swampy 
valley, heavily timbered and with dense under- 
growth, along a narrow road where deployment 
was impossible and where the column would be ex- 
posed to direct artillery fire for a distance of nearly 
a mile. 

Had General Wallace been familiar with the 
roads covering the territory which it was his special 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 101 

province to guard, no guide could have misled him, 
and he would not have said that he was on ' ' the only 
road he knew anything about". His position at 
Crump 's Landing was as much exposed to attack as 
was the camp at Pittsburg Landing, and he was as 
likely to need support as he was to be called on for 
support. It was of the utmost importance for the 
safety of his own command that he know the short- 
est and best road between the two camps. 

Forty years after the event General Wallace was 
forced to confess that he had all that time been la- 
boring under a mistake as to the position of the 
head of his column when the order was given to 
counter-march. He had all this time supposed that 
he was overlooking Owl Creek at the right of Sher- 
man's lines when Captain Rowley came up and 
found his division "at rest", while his cavalry was 
scouting to the front. Instead of overlooking Owl 
Creek, he was overlooking the valley of Clear Creek 
three or four miles to the north. Of these facts 
General Wallace was convinced, not long before his 
death, by a personal inspection of the territory and 
the roads over which his division marched, in com- 
pany with the Secretary and Historian of the Shiloh 
National Military Park Commission, several of his 
own officers, with citizens living in the locality, and 
with a Confederate cavalry officer who was watching 
his movements on that Sundav. 



102 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

Strangely, General Wallace allowed this con- 
fessed error to stand in his Autobiography, with 
only partial correction. 

It seems not to be generally known, though it has 
been a matter of official record since 1863, that Gen- 
eral Wallace in view of General Grant's criticism 
of his (Wallace's) conduct at Shiloh, asked of the 
Secretary of War a court of inquiry. The date of 
the request was July 18th, 1863 ; but on September 
16th following, the Secretary of War was asked to 
" suspend action in the matter", General Wallace 
stating that he might be able to " satisfy General 
Grant upon the points involved". 90 It was on the 
advice of General Sherman that the request for a 
court of inquiry was withdrawn, and the request 
was never renewed, though General Grant had 
found no reason to modify his original criticism, 
down to the time of writing the chapter on Shiloh, 
for his Memoirs? 1 After the writing of that chap- 
ter, however, a letter came into General Grant's 
hands, written by General Lew. Wallace to General 
W. H. L. Wallace, dated April 5, 1862 (correct date 
April 4th). In this letter General Grant finds rea- 
sons for "materially" modifying the criticisms up- 
on General Wallace, as they appear in the chapter 
itself, appending a foot-note thereto by way of 
explanation. 92 

The writer hereof is impressed with the idea that 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 103 

it was the promptings of General Grant's generous 
nature, rather than the contents of the letter that 
prompted the foot-note. It is not entirely clear, in 
view of the admissions made by General Wallace 
in his Autobiography, that the letter from General 
Lew. Wallace to General W. H. L. Wallace does 
not furnish additional ground for censure. At the 
moment of writing the letter the author of it must 
have been "simmering" in his mind the knowledge 
that the Confederate army was then on the inarch 
to attack Grant; and yet there was no mention in 
the letter of that important fact. The reader must 
draw his own conclusions. 



ILLUSTRATIVE MAPS 




MAP 1 — Showing the territory over which General Grant operated from 
September 4, 1861, to the time of the Battle of Shiloh, together with the 

LOCATION OF THE IMPORTANT PLACES MENTIONED JX THE TEXT. It ALSO SHOW'S THE 
ADVANCE OF BUELL 'S AKMY PROM NASHVILLE TO SHILOH. 




MAP II — A VIEW OF THE PLATEAU ABOVE PITTSBURG LANDING, SHOWING THE PRINCIPAL 
ROADS, CREEKS, CULTIVATED FIELDS, LOCATION OF CAMPSj WOODED CONDITION, ETC. 




.MAP IIT — Showing the Confederate lines as they were on Saturday night; 
Praley Field where the picket fight occurred on Sunday morning, and the 
advance to attack. on the union side the map shows first and second posi- 
TIONS of Prentiss and Stuart, and first positions of Sherman, McClernand, 
Wallace, and Hurlbut. 






^ M- 



I' 



ShUok /ofo //:3o A.m. April /#6j2. 

TWVs 

2>»J» > 

/cWRelel V. 




Lfcllc^jlg 



MAP LV — Showing the general situation up to about noon on Sunday. 




.MAI' V — Showing change down to about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. 




s 




^<3 * 


Qq 




'V 




41 




°5 < 


i 


o ? 


. 


V3 «* \ 


1 


a *» 








w . ^, 




s ~ 


( 


«. ft - 


2 


* < 


|z 


o 





^o 



/ 



•^'i^ 



4 




sf/ 






MAI' VI — Showing Ruggles's battery (62 guns) bombarding the Hornets' Nest, 
and the situation at the time of the surrender at that point. the lines 
facing each other across dlll branch were the last lines of the day, sunday. 
the batteries in grant 's line were ale there as represented: (1) markgraf 6; 
(2) Munch 5; (.'!) Powell 5; (4) Silfversparre 4; (5) McAllister 2; (6) Stone 
4; (7) Dresser 2; (8) Mann 3; (9) Siege Guns 6; (10) Eichardson4; (11) Nispel 
2; (12) Welker 3; (13) Hickenlooper 2; (14) Bouton 4 (?). Two other hat 

TERIES WERE SOMEWHERE ALONG THE LINE, BUT NEVER HAVING BEEN DEFINITELY LOCAT- 
ED ARE NOT REPRESENTED. ((f) 36TH INDIANA SUPPORTING STONE'S BATTERY. 




MAP VII— The movements on Monday the ri'ii are so little complicated as to 

BE EASILY TRACED, WITHOUT ANALYSIS. 




'"a-i-ar.r 



V 4 / /v^-W ■•■■ •'• 




MAP VIII — Roads north of Owl and Snake creeks showing Lew. Wallace' 

ADVANCE FROM CRUMP 's LANDING, SXONYLONESOME, AND ADAMSVILLE. 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 

1 Greeley's The American Conflict, Vol. II, pp. 58-61. 

2 Cist's The Army of the Cumberland, pp. 74, 75. 

3 Cist's The Army of the Cumberland, p. 77. 

4 The Century Magazine, Vol. XXXI, p. 749. 

3 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII 
p. 561. 

6 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII 
p. 121. 

7 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII 
p. 593. 

s War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII 
p. 587. 

9 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII 
pp. 574, 576. 

10 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII 
p. 933. 

11 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII 
pp. 594, 599, 612. 

12 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII 
p. 660. 

13 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 38. 



118 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

14 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII, 
p. 628. 

is War j t] (e Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII, 
p. 674. 

i6 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII, 
pp. 680, 682. 

17 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X. 
Part II, pp. 3-5. 

18 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, pp. 21-26. 

19 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, pp. 9, 10. 

20 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X. 
Part I, p. 8. 

21 War of the Rebellion : Official Records, Series I, Vol. X. 
Part I, p. 25. 

22 Wallace's Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 446, 451. 

23 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 46. 

24 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 49. 

25 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 51. 

26 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, pp. 50-51. 

27 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 55. 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 119 

28 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X. 
Part II, p. 62. 

29 The several requests to be relieved of command in Hal- 
leek's department bear date of March 7, 9, and 11. — War of 
the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 
15, 21, 30. 

30 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 25. 

31 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X. 
Part II, p. 33. 

32 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, pp. 42, 51, 77. 

33 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 47. 

34 The following is the itinerary of General Nelson 's march 
from Columbia, as given by Colonel Ammen, commanding the 
advance brigade : March 30, 4 miles ; March 31, 10 miles ; 
April 1, 14 miles; April 2, 16 miles; April 3, 15 miles; April 
4, 10!/4 miles; April 5, 9!/2 miles. — Ammen 's Diary in War 
of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 
330. 

35 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, pp. 94, 95. 

36 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 94. 

37 Proceedings of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, 
Vol. XIV-XVI, p. 71. 

38 Proceedings of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, 
Vol. XIV-XVI, p. 77. 



120 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

39 Quoted by Major D. W. Reed in a paper published in the 
Proceedings of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, Vol. 
XXXVI, p. 216. 

40 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 181. 

41 Wallace's Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 454-456. 

42 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 278. 

43 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 603. 

44 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 464. 

45 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 603. 

46 Since writing the above the author has learned from 
General Charles Morton, who helped to carry the body from 
the field, that Major Powell was killed later in the day — 
about noon, at the Hornets' Nest. 

47 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 294. 

48 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 581. 

49 Johnston's Life of General A. S. Johnston, p. 620. 

50 Reed's Campaigns and Battles of the Twelfth Regiment 
Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infantry, p. 50. 

51 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 475. 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 121 

52 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 472. 

53 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 323. 

54 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, pp. 550-551. 

55 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 555. 

56 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 334. 

57 Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, p. 297. 

5S Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, pp. 300, 
301. 

59 Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, p. 307. 

60 Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, p. 316. 

61 Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, pp. 316- 
317. 

62 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 95. 

«3 yy ar j fj ie Rebellion; Official Records, Vol. LII, Part I, 
p. 232. 

64 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, pp. 95-96. 

65 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I. p. 292. 

66 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 323. 



122 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

67 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 323. 

68 The Century Magazine, Vol. XXXI, p. 771. 

69 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, pp. 97, 104. 

70 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 98. 

71 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 110. 

72 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 112. 

73 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 110. 

74 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 98. 

75 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 102. 

76 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 110. 

77 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 23. 

78 War of the Rebellion : Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 170. 

79 War of the Rebellion : Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 175. 

so War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 185. 

81 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, p. 170. 

82 Wallace's Autobiography, Vol. I. p. 463. 

83 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, pp. 185-186. 

In 1886 Captain Baxter related his recollections of this 
incident for publication in The New York Mail and Express 



NOTES AND REFERENCES 123 

(November 4, 1886) which are republished in Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. I, p. 607, as follows : 

"On Sunday, between the hours of 8 and 9 o'clock a. m., 
April 6, 1862, Adjutant General Rawlins, of General Grant's 
staff, requested me to go to Crump's Landing (five miles be- 
low) and order General Lew Wallace to march his command 
at once by the river road to Pittsburg Landing, and join the 
army on the right. At the same time, General Rawlins dic- 
tated the order, which was written by myself and signed by 
General Rawlins. 

"On meeting General Wallace, I gave the order verbally, 
also handed to him the written order. General Wallace said 
he was waiting for orders, had heard the firing all the morning, 
and was ready to move with his command immediately — 
knew the road and had put it in good order." 

84 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, pp. 185-186. 

85 War of the Rebellion : Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 179. 

86 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 179. 

87 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I. p. 180. 

88 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 187. 

89 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part II, p. 188. 

90 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, 
Part I, pp. 188-190. 

91 Personal Memoirs of V. S. Grant, Vol. I, pp. 337-338. 

92 Personal Memoirs of U. 8. Grant, Vol. I, p. 351. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Abbott, J. S. C, sensational ac- 
count of Battle of Shiloh by, 13 

Adamsville (Tennessee), brigade 
of Wallace's division at, 91, 92, 
99, 100 

Ammen, Colonel Jacob, brigade 
commanded by, 76; reference to, 
85, 119 

Anderson, General Patton, brigade 
commanded by, 60 

Appier, Colonel Jesse J., 58; dis- 
appearance of, from field, 59 

Artillery, use of, in battle, 70, 71, 
73, 74 

Babk road, 50 

Baxter, Captain, order carried to 
Wallace by, 94, 95, 96; recol- 
lections by, 122, 123 

Bear Creek, 29 

Beauregard, General P. G. T., 14. 
16, 27, 51, 88; concentration of 
army under, 36 ; attempt to place 
blame on, 77 

Belknap, Major William W., 6 

Bell (Scout), news brought by, 46 

Belmont, Battle of, 23 

Bloody Pond, 69 

Bowen, General John S., brigade 
commanded by, 62, 64, 65 

Bowling Green (Kentucky), 22, 25 

Bragg, General Braxton, statement 
by, 54; reference to, 60; com- 
mand assumed by, 66 ; operations 



of, after capture of Hornets' 
Nest, 74 

Breckenridge, General John C, 
Confederate reserve under, 64, 
65 

Buckland, Colonel Ralph P., re- 
connoitering by, 39, 40 ; account 
of events preceding battle by, 
39-41; reprimand to, 40, 45; 
brigade commanded by, 59, 60 

Buell, General Don Carlos, account 
of Battle of Shiloh by, 14, 19- 
21; credit for saving battle 
given to, 17, 18; arrival of army 
of, on field, 18, 82-89, 84; ref- 
erence to, 24, 26, 27; commun- 
ications between Halleck and, 
25; disagreement between Hal- 
leck and, 27, 28; Halleck placed 
in command over, 28 ; Grant or- 
dered to connect with, 33 ; move- 
ments of, 35-38 ; plan of Con- 
federates to defeat, 51; part 
played by, in Battle of Shiloh, 
72-77, 79; note from Grant to, 
83; order held up by, 85; atti- 
tude of, toward Grant's orders, 
86, 87; attitude of, toward bat- 
tle, 87; position of army of, in 
Monday's battle, 88 

Cairo (Illinois), headquarters of 
Grant at, 22; reference to, 23 



128 



INDEX 



Carpenter (Scout), news brought 
by, 46 

Chalmers, General James R., bri- 
gade commanded by, 56, 61, 62, 
65, 74, 75, 76 

Chattanooga (Tennessee), 27; im- 
portance of, 28 

Cist, Henry M., errors in account 
of Battle of Shiloh by, 17 

Clarksville (Tennessee), occupa- 
tion of, 26 

Clear Creek, 99, 100, 101 

Cleburne, General Patrick R., bri- 
gade commanded by, 59, 60 

Columbia (Tennessee), Buell's ad- 
vance at, 28, 35, 36; itinerary 
of Nelson's march from, 119 

Columbus (Kentucky), 22, 25; im- 
portance of, 23 ; evacuation of, 
27 

Confederate army, description and 
objective of, 51, 52; condition 
of, at close of Sunday's battle. 
80; number of troops in, 89, 90; 
losses in, 90, 91 

Confederates, number of, in Battle 
of Shiloh, 15, 16, 31; weak point 
in line of, 22 ; evacuation of 
Columbus by, 27; new line es- 
tablished by, 27; Wallace's 
knowledge of movements of, 45, 
46 ; resistance met by, 56 ; plan 
of, to seize Landing, 61; diffi 
culties confronting, 74 ; ' ' lost 
opportunity" of, 77-79; stub 
born fighting by, 89 

Corinth (Mississippi), condition of 
Confederates after evacuation of. 
14; importance of, 27; reference 
to, 28, 29, 31; movement of 
Confederates from, 32, 39, 46, 
51 ; expedition toward, 33 ; diffi- 



culty in attacking, 33; concen- 
tration of Confederates at, 36, 51 

Corinth road, 50, 57, 63, 69 

Crittenden, General Thomas L., 
division commanded by, 86; 
charge by regiment under, 88 

Crump's Landing, Wallace's divi- 
sion at, 18, 30, 31, 32, 45, 91; 
reference to, 82, 98, 123; stop 
made by Grant at, 92; arrival 
of Rowley at, 97 ; exposed posi- 
tion of camp at, 101 

Cumberland River, importance of 
line of, 21-23 

Decatur (Alabama), 27, 36 
Dickey, Colonel T. Lyle, desire of, 

to reconnoiter, 41 
Dill Branch, 72, 73, 74, 76 
Dodge, General Grenville M., 7 
Duck River, 28, 35, 36, 37 
Duncan Field, 63, 69, 71; number 

of dead in, 68 

Eastport (Tennessee), 29 

Fiske, John, errors in account of 

Battle of Shiloh by, 15-17 
Foote, Commodore A. H., advice of, 

24 
Fort Donelson, Confederates forced 

back to, 23; capture of, 26; 

events after capture of, 27-35, 

51; reference to, 28, 47 
Fort Henry, Confederates forced 

back to, 23; report of Smith 

concerning, 23, 24; capture of, 

by Grant, 24, 25; events after 

capture of, 26 ; reference to, 28 ; 

Grant at, 29 ; expedition from, 30 
Fraley Field, 53 
Fremont, General John C, 22 



INDEX 



129 



Gibson, Colonel Randall L., bri- 
gade commanded by, 68 

Gladden, General Adley H., bri- 
gade commanded by, 56, 62, 65; 
death of, 56 

Grant, General Frederick D., 7 

Grant, General Ulysses S., prej- 
udice against, 14 ; policy wrong- 
ly attributed to, 15 ; number of 
guns in line of, 16 ; dispatch of, 
misquoted, 17; reinforcements to 
army of, 17; headquarters of, 
at Cairo, 22; result of prompt 
action of, 23; offense to Hal- 
leck by, 26, 27; orders from 
Halleck to, 28, 29, 32, 33; sus- 
pension of, from command, 29; 
expedition planned without con- 
sultation with, 30 ; restoration 
of, to command, 30, 32; orders 
issued by, 33; anxiety of, 34; 
rejection of advice of, 35; Buell 
ordered to join, 36 ; couriers sent 
to Buell by, 36; Buell's arrival 
not known to, 37, 38; authority 
of, in case of attack, 38, 85; 
Wallace's knowledge of attack 
on, 45, 46 ; failure of Wallace to 
send information to, 46, 47; plan 
of Confederates to defeat, 51; 
failure of Confederates to sur- 
prise, 52; new line formed by, 
72 ; strength of position of, 74 ; 
blame for failure to defeat, 77 ; 
condition of army of, at close of 
Sunday's battle, 79, 80; trans- 
fer in headquarters of, 82; in- 
structions to Nelson from, 82, 83, 
84, 85; note to Buell from, 83; 
movements of, behind lines, 86 ; 
attitude of Buell toward orders 
of, 86, 87 ; position of army of, 



in Monday's battle, 88; reason 
for failure of, to pursue Con- 
federates, 89; number of troops 
in army of, 89, 90; losses in 
army of, 90, 91 ; orders to Wal- 
lace from, 92-99; criticism of 
Wallace by, 102; modification of 
criticisms by, 102; generosity of, 

io;: 
Greeley, Horace, errors in account 

of Battle of Shiloh by, 13 
Grose, Colonel William, statements 

by. 76 

Hahn, William J., acknowledg- 
ments to, 11 

Halleck, General Henry W., report 
by, 14; waiting policy of, 15; 
reference to, 23, 24, 31, 34, 36, 37, 
85, 94; communications between 
Buell and, 25; desire of, for 
more troops, 25, 26; disagree- 
ment between Buell and, 27, 28; 
command of two departments as- 
sumed by, 28; orders to Grant 
from, 28, 29, 32, 33, 38; orders 
to Buell from, 35, 36; adherence 
to orders of, 44, 45 ; effect of in- 
structions of, 89 

Hamburg and Purdy road, 50, 57 

Hamburg and Savannah road, 50, 
51, 66, 69, 72, 73 

Hardcastle, Major Aaron B., ac- 
count of skirmish by, 53, 54 

Hardee, General William ,T., corps 
commanded by, 59 

Harris, Governor Isham G., 65 

Headley, Joel Tyler, errors in his- 
tory by, 14 

Henderson, David B., 6 

Hildebrand, Colonel Jesse, brigade 
commanded by, 58, 59, 60 



130 



INDEX 



Hindman, General Thomas C, bri- 
gade commanded by, 68 

Holman, T. W., acknowledgments 
to, 11 

Hornets' Nest, Iowa troops in, 5; 
errors relative to, 19 ; reference 
to, 64, 80, S7; description of 
fight at, 67-72; number captured 
in, 71, 72; importance of, 72; 
surprise of Confederates at small 
number in, 72; prisoners taken 
in, 91; death of Powell at, 120 

Humboldt (Tennessee), 29 

Hurlbut, General Stephen A., divi- 
sion commanded by, 31, 32; ref- 
erence to, 50, 62, 64, 65, 66; 
losses in division commanded by, 
90 

Illinois, troops of, in Battle of 
Shiloh, 40, 61, 63, 66, 69 

Indiana, troops of, in Battle of 
Shiloh, 73, 76 

Iowa, troops of, in Battle of 
Shiloh, 5, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 87 

Jackson, General John K., brigade 
commanded by, 61, 62, 65, 74, 75 

Jackson (Tennessee), 29, 31 

Johnson, General Bushrod B., bri- 
gade commanded by, 60 

Johnston, General Albert Sidney, 
criticism of, 16, 50; death of, 
18, 19, 65, 66; errors in state- 
ments relative to, 19; command 
of Confederates assumed by, 27, 
51; reference to, 28; concentra- 
tion of army under, 36; plan of, 
to join Beauregard, 51 ; Confed- 
erate movements directed by, 62 ; 
story concerning, 65 ; biography 
of, 67 ; number of troops in army 



of, 89, 90; losses in army of, 90, 
91 

Johnston, William Preston, state- 
ments by, 67, 6S 

Jones's Field, 64 

Jordan, Colonel Thomas, discussion 
of ''lost opportunity" by, 77, 
78, 79 

King, Major John H., wound re- 
ceived by, 55 

Lauman, General Jacob D., brigade 
commanded by, 62 

Lick Creek, crossing of, 57 ; ref- 
erence to, 61 

Little Log Meeting House, 69 

McArthur, General John, brigade 

commanded by, 63; reference to, 

65, 66 
McClellan, General George B., 25, 

28 
McClernand, General John A., 15, 

62, 63, 66; division commanded 

by, 32, 60; losses in division 

commanded by, 90 
McCook, General Alexander M., 

division commanded by, 86 
McDowell, Colonel John A., brigade 

commanded by, 60 
MePherson, Colonel James B., 41, 

47, 93, 100; orders to Wallace 

carried by, 98, 99 
Mann, Lieutenant, wound received 

by, 55 
Mason, Colonel Rodney, 61 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, 

27, 31, 34, 51 
Michigan, troops of, in Battle of 

Shiloh, 55 



INDEX 



131 



Miller, Colonel Madison, brigade 

commanded by, 55 
Mississippi, troops of, in Battle of 

Sbiloh, 59 
Missouri, troops of, in Battle of 

Shiloh, 42, 43, 44, 52, 53, 54, 

55, 70 
Mobile and Ohio Bailroad, 27, 30 
Moore, Colonel David, reenforcing 

party under, 52, 53, 54; wound 

received by, 55 
Morton, General Charles, 7, 120 

Nashville (Tennessee), 25, 28; 
occupation of, 26, 27; evacua- 
tion of, 27, 51; Buell on march 
from, 51 

Neal, W. A., account of action of 
Peabody by, 42 

Nelson, General William, division 
commanded by, 16, 19, 26, 36, 
37, 76, 85; number of troops 
brought into battle by, 17; state- 
ments by, concerning artillery, 
73 ; Grant 's instructions to, 82, 
83, 84, 85; reference to, 86; 
charge by regiment under, 88; 
itinerary of march of, 119 

Newhard, James M., account of ac- 
tion of Peabody by, 42 

Nichols, Captain F. C, letter to 
Peabody from, 43, 44; reference 
to, 53 

Nott, Surgeon J. O, statement by, 
78 

Ohio, troops of, in Battle of 

Shiloh, 40, 58, 59, 61 
Ohio, Army of the, 76; losses in, 

90, 91 
Owl Creek, 49, 57, 60, 61, 97, 99, 

100, 101 



Paducah (Kentucky), expedition 
to, 22; reference to, 23 

Paris, Comte de, account of Battle 
of Shiloh by, 17 

Paris (Tennessee), 29 

Peabody, Colonel Everett, 11; re- 
connoitering party sent out by, 
42, 43, 52; death of, 43, 56; 
reprimand to, by Prentiss, 43, 
44, 45; brigade commanded by, 
55 

Peabody, F. E., letter to, 43, 44 

Peach Orchard, 62, 64, 66, 87 

Pittsburg Landing, first regimeut 
to disembark at, 5; description 
of camp at, 13; ranking officer 
at, 15 ; reference to, 18, 34, 36, 
101, 123 ; Army of the Tennessee 
at, 21; attack on camp at, 30; 
troops in camp at, 31, 47; rea- 
sons for conditions at, 35; Buell 
ordered to concentrate at, 36; 
description of, 49, 50; Sher- 
man's division in camp at, 57; 
plan of Confederates to seize, 
61 ; Wallace 's division at, 63 ; 
Grant's headquarters moved to, 
82; arrival of Buell at, 84 

Polk, General Leonidas, 60 

Pond, Colonel Preston, Jr., brigade 
commanded by, 60 

Powell, Major James E., 11; death 
of, 43, 56, 120; reconnoitering 
party led by, 43, 52-54 

Prentiss, General Benjamin M., 
division commanded by, 13, 50, 
62, 64, 66; reference to, 14, 16, 
18, 42, 48, 55, 57, 59, 70 ; re- 
connoitering party sent out from 
division under, 15, 52 ; recon- 
noitering party sent out without 
knowledge of, 42; Peabody rep- 



132 



INDEX 



rimanded by, 43, 44, 45; readi- 
ness of division under, for at- 
tack, 44, 45; losses in division 
commanded by, 90 
Purdy road, 89 

Rawlins, Captain J. A., 93, 95, 
96, 97, 100, 123; order repro- 
duced by, 94; orders to Wallace 
carried by, 98, 99 

Reed, D. W., 6, 120; researches 
by, 10; acknowledgments to, 11; 
description of battle at Hornets ' 
Nest by, 68, 69 

Reid, WMtelaw, praise of Buell by, 
17, 18 

Rhea. Field, 53, 55, 58 

Rich, Joseph W., qualifications of, 
for writing history of battle, 6, 
7 ; author 's preface by, 9 

Ropes, John Codman, errors in ac- 
count of Battle of Shiloh by, 14, 
89 ; failure of, tu understand 
topography of field, 50 

Rowley, Captain William R., 93, 
99, 101; orders to Wallace car- 
ried by, 96-98 

Ruggles, General Daniel, command 
assumed by, 66; statement by, 
69 ; artillery called up by, 70, 71 

Ramsey, Captain I. P., account of 
events preceding battle by, 41 

Russell, Colonel R. M., brigade 
commanded by, 60 

St. Louis, headquarters of Fre- 
mont at, 22 ; reference to, 28, 30 
Sandidge, Captain L. D., 71 
Savannah (Tennessee), Smith's 
headquarters at, 30 ; reference 
to, 32, 47, 83; troops at, 32; 
concentration of Grant's army 



at, 35 ; Buell ordered to con- 
centrate at, 36; departure of 
couriers from, 36; arrival of 
Buell at, 37; failure of Buell to 
report arrival at, 38; Grant's 
headquarters moved from, 82 

Saxe, Captain Edward, death of, 
55 

Scribuer Brothers, errors in his- 
tory published by, 13 

Seay Field, 53, 55 

Shambaugh, Benj. F., editor's in- 
troduction by, 5 

Shaver, Colonel R. G., brigade com- 
manded by, 55, 56 

Sherman, Buren R., 6 

Sherman, General William T., divi- 
sion commanded by, 13, 16, 18, 
31, 32, 39, 40, 42, 57, 58; ref- 
erence to, 14, 15, 44, 45, 62, 66, 
87 ; orderly of, killed, 58 ; at- 
tack upon division under, 59-62; 
losses in division commanded by, 
90 

Shiloh, Jiattle of, Iowa regimeuts 
engaged in, 5 ; misrepresentations 
of, 9, 10; criticism of inaccurate 
accounts of, 13-21; relation of, 
to other military operations, 21- 
27; events preceding, 27, 38-47; 
condition of Union army at, 47, 
48; description of field of, 48- 
51; description of, 52-89; first 
Union officer killed in, 55 ; part 
played by Buell in, 72-77; "lost 
opportunity ' ' of Confederates 
in, 77-79; numbers engaged and 
losses in, 89-91 ; criticism of 
Wallace 's conduct at, 102, 103 ; 
maps illustrative of, 107-114 

Sir loh Branch, 55, 58 



INDEX 



13;] 



Shiloh National Military Park 
Commission, map prepared by, 9 

Shunpike road, 99 

Smith, General Charles F., expedi- 
tion commanded by, 23, 24, 29, 
30; report by, 30, 31; reference 
to, 32, 63, 94; difficulty of ex- 
pedition of, 34 

Snake Creek, 46, 47, 49, 63, 72, 92. 
96, 98, 99, 100 

Spain Field, 55 

Statkam, Colonel Win Held S., bri- 
gade commanded by, 62, 64, 65 

Stephens, Colonel William H., bri- 
gade commanded by, 62, 65 

Stewart, General Alexander P.. 
brigade commanded by, 68 

Stibbs, John II., 7 

Stone, Major William M.. 6 

Stonylonesome (Tennessee), bri- 
gade of Wallace's division at, 
91 ; reference to, 92 ; beginning 
of Wallace 's march from, 99 

Stuart, Colonel David, 16, 63, 65 ; 
brigade commanded by, 57, 61; 
wound received by, 66 

Sunken road, 63, 68; description 
of, 69, 70 

Sweeny, Colonel Thomas W., bri- 
gade commanded by, 63, 66, 69, 
70 

Tennessee, troops of, in Battle of 
Shiloh, 75 

Tennessee, Army of the, operations 
of, 21; condition of. 47, 48; 
losses in, 90 

Tennessee River, importance of line 
of, 21-23, 28 ; expedition up, 29 ; 
troops on west side of, 32; coun- 
try west of, in hands of Con- 
federates, 34; plateau on east 



side of, 48, 49; difficulty of 
crossing, 49 

Thompson, Atwell, battle-field plat- 
ted by. 10 

Trabue, Colonel Robert P., brigade 
commanded by, 64 

Tuttle, General .lames M., brigade 
commanded by, 63, 66, 70; ref- 
erence to, 67; statements by, 87 

UNION army, occupation of Nash- 
ville by, 27; condition of, 47, 
48; readiness of, for attack, 56, 
57; last attack upon, 74-76; 
casualties among officers in, 80, 
81; stragglers from. 81, 82; total 
reinforcements to, 86; number 
of troops in, 89, 90; losses in, 
90, 91 

[Jrquhart, Colonel David, statement 
by, 78, 79 

VEATCH, Colonel James C. brigade 
commanded by, 62 

Yillard, Henry, errors in account 
of Battle of Shiloh by, 17; ref- 
erence to. 84, 85 

Wallace, General Lew., number of 
troops brought into battle by, 
17; errors in account of Battle 
of Shiloh by, 18, 19; division 
commanded by, 19, 30, 32, 63, 
88; statements by, 31, 32; 
knowledge of attack possessed 
by, 45, 46 ; failure of, to inform 
Grant of attack, 46, 47; refer- 
ence to, 60, 72 ; Grant 's orders 
to, 82; arrival of, 85; losses in 
division commanded by, 90; late 
arrival of division of, 91-103; 



134 



INDEX 



criticism of, 93; march of divi- 
sion under, 99-101; court of in- 
quiry requested by, 102; request 
-withdrawn by, 102; letter writ- 
ten by, 102, 103; orders carried 
to, by Baxter, 123 

Wallace, General William H. L., 
wound received by, 18 ; refer- 
ence to, 41, 50; division com- 
manded by, 63; orders by, 67; 
death of, 67; losses in division 
commanded by, 90; letter from 
Lew. Wallace to, 102, 103 

Waynesboro (Tennessee), desire 
of Buell to camp at, 37 



Webster, Colonel J. D., artillery 
of, 78 

Williams, Colonel Nelson G., bri- 
gade commanded by, 62 

Wisconsin, troops of, in Battle of 
Shiloh, 55 

Withers, General Jones M., divi- 
sion commanded by, 74, 78, 79 

Wood, General Sterling A. M., bri- 
gade commanded by, 55, 56, 60 

Wood, General Thomas J., Grant's 
orders to, 83; division command- 
ed by, 86 

Woodyard, Lieutenant Colonel 
Humphrey M., 54 



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